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SUMMARY:
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FACTS & PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Resp is an Illinois

not-for-profit corpora tion organized to develop low and
moderate income ho using in t he Chicago metropolitan area.
It was selected by t he owner s of a parcel of land in
Arlington Heights t o develop the land for low and moderate
income housing.

The land i s vacant acreage bounded on two

sides by single-famil y residences and on the other sides by
t~e

owners' undeveloped property.

The owners agreed to

lease the land for 99 years to resp, and the agreement provided that resp would develop low and moderate income housing
subsidized pursuant to the National Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l.

-

The land in question was, and always had been, zoned
R-3 (single-family dwelling units) by petr Village.
·•

Petr's

w~

"Comprehensive Plan, " adopted in 1959, provides that "an area
should be zoned R-5 [multi-family dwelling units] only if it
represents a 'buffer' zone or transition [area] between single
family zoning and commercial, industrial, or other high intensity areas."

517 F.2d, at 411.

In order to develop the

housing project, resp needed the land re-zoned from R-3 to R-5.
Resp applied for such re-zoning.

After hearings, petr's Plan

Commission rejected re-zoning by a 6-1 vote.

"The apparent reason

___

for the rejection was that the property was in the middle of a
....._.._
completely single family
area and would not act as a buffer zone

as required by the Comprehensive Plan."

517 F.2d, at 411.

- 3 -

When re-zoning was rejected, resps filed suit
claiming "that the refusal to rezone perpetuated segregation
and denied [resp] the right to use its property in a reasonable manner in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982), the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983), and the Fair Housing Act of
1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3601, et

~.)."

517 F.2d, at 411.

The District Court (N.D. Ill.) (McMillen, J.) denied
relief.

He found the Fair Housing Act irrelevant, 373 F. Supp.

208, 209, and held that "[p]laintiffs have failed to carry
their burden of proving discrimination by defendants against

-

racial minorities as distinguished from the under-privileged

---

generally . • • • The Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights
/ Act[s?] prohibit discrimination against blacks and certain
other minorities but does not afford rights to poor people as

l

such."

373 F. Supp., at 210.

IJ...tt::...

He found "no direct evidence" of

racially discriminatory intent on petr's part.

Ibid.

Indeed,

he found that petr had "good faith reasons" for pursuing its
zoning scheme, which -- in light of decreased property values
which would result from re-zoning -- he found rational.

He also

found that petr's re-zoning decisions had not been made
arbitrarily or capriciously:

petr had zoned 60 tracts for R-5

-

use, some of which were still vacant and available to resp.
~-------

CA 7 reversed in a 2-1 decision.

The majority upheld as

not clearly erroneous the District Court's findings that petr

(.,_____.-

did not have racially discriminatory intent and did not re-zone

,,

- 4 a~bitrarily

or capriciously.

The court then stated that

the "real question is whether there is a racially dis·~·.::-iminatory

anded] • 11

effect for equal protection purposes [Emphasis

517 F.2d, at 413.

The court noted that Blacks

comprise 40% of e l igible prospective tenants.
of computing t he figure is not given.)

(The method

But, relying on

Jame s v. Valtierra , 402 U.S. 137, the court found that the
rlass here af fected was composed of low and moderate income

tamil ies and that the coincidental "racial disparity alone
as .L t re la t es t o t he housing project under consideration does
~u ::-

amoun t t o racial discrimination."

517 F.2d, at 413.

However, the court said that the analysis of racial
"~iscrim in ati on

for Equal Protection purposes did not stop there.

Rather , re lying on Kennedy Parks Home Ass'n. v. City of
~ ackawanna,

436 F.2d 108 (CA 2 1970), the court said that petr's

.refusal to rezone "must be assessed not only in its immediate
objective bu t its historical context and ultimate effect."
117 F . 2d, at 413.

The court then examined the "high degree of

racial residential segregation" in metropolitan Chicago, the
vir t ually all-white makeup of Arlington Heights (1970 census:
64,857 whites, 27 blacks), the need for low and moderate income
housing there, and the racial impact resp's housing project woul d
have (alleviation of housing need in Chicago area and increase of
Arlington Heights' minority population by 1,000%, 517 F.2d, at
414).

In this light, the court found that petr

~ad

"ignored"

the problem of segregated housing patterns to the extent of

•.

~

"exploiting the proble:TJ by

5 I.

\\

~allowing itself to become an

almost one hundred per cent Whit e community."
at 414.

517 F.2d,

Because of these "facts," the court held the petr's

''rejection of the
effects."

***

proposal has racially discriminatory

517 F.2d, at 415.

The court subjected petr's

It
''
1 • _/
zoning plan to strict scrutiny, and found that neither the ~ 7

buffer policy of the zoning plan nor the protection of
ne.ighborhood property values constituted compelling state
interests.
Chief Judge Fairchild filed a brief dissent.

In

essence, he thought that the District Court's findings of fact
were not clearly erroneous and that resp could have constructed
its project at one of the vacant R-4 sites.

He did not take

issue with the majority on the law, but rather appears to have
concluded that resps suffered no injury since other sites
already zoned for multi-family dwellings -- were available for
the project.
CA 7 denied rehearing en bane, 5-3 (PELL, TONE, BAUER, JJ,
dissenting).
3.

CONTENTIONS:
a.

Petr contends that CA 7's decision conflicts

with "repeated" decisions of this Court that housing and zoning
are not subject to the compelling state interest test, and with
decisions that hold inapplicable the compelling state interest
test where the state act affects a lower income group that
happens to have a higher percentage of blacks than whites.

,,

- 6 E .g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1; James
v. Valtierra, supra.

Petr also contends that CA 7 erred in

"subst ituting its judgment" for that of petr with respect to
t he validity and reasonableness of the zoning ordinances.
Finally, petr contends that under Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

\

no r esp had standing to sue.
b.

Resp contends that the decision is correct and

tha t CAs have uniformly refused to permit municipalities
obstructE&g private desegregation efforts.

h

f t !!!ll

The decision is a

narrow one, says resp, limited to "the facts of this case."
CA 7 majority opinion, 517 F.2d, at 415.

Resps have standing,

they say, under Warth, because -- unlike the Warth plaintiffs
-- they "challenged zoning testrictions as applied to particular
projects that would supply housing within their means, and of
which they were intended residents.

The plaintiffs were thus

able to demonstrate that unless relief from assertedly illegal
actions was forthcoming, their immediate and personal interests
would be harmed."
4.

422 U.S., at 507.

DISCUSSION:
a.

Standing -- Resps appear to be correct, at

least with respect to plaintiff-intervenor-respondent Maldonado,
who apparently fits the approved formulation in Warth, supra.
b.

Merits -- This is but one more of many cases

wh~e munici~nint

alle ed raciall

regulations have been

disc

atta~ed

for th.eir

See, e.g., Preliminary

Memo for No. 74-1293, City of Black Jack v. United States, cert .

.I

~

·•

- 7 i!enied, June 23, 197 5, rehearing denied, October 6, 1975.
(But note that Black Jack arose under the Fair Housing Act.)

-

-

CA 7vs reasoning i s very suspect.

It relies in part on

Clark v, Universal Builders, supra, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
821.

However, Clark was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and CA 7

there found evidence that blacks were charged prices "unreasonably in excess " of prices charged whites for similar
housing.

The cases and their rationales are easily dis-

t.inguisb.able.

At bottom, CA 7 has admitted that there is no

affected " suspect class" here but has nevertheless found
"racially discriminatory effect" based on historical residential
patterns and therefore applied a compelling state interest test.
I find this hard to square with the principles of James v.

'--·

Valtierra.
c.

Conflicts with Other CAs -- Petr alleges several

conflicts between this decision and other CAs' decisions.
overstate the problem, but it is nonetheless real.

Petrs

CA 7's de-

cision conflicts with Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d
250 (CA 9 1974).

In Ybarra, CA 9 held valid a large-lot zoning

ordinance challenged by poor Mexican-Americans who proved that
the ordinance "prevented poor people from living in Los Altos."
503 F.2d, at 253.

CA 9 found no suspect class and concluded that

the zoning ordinance was rational.

(Resp says Ybarra is dis-

tinguishable, because CA 7 made the same holding but went on to
find unlawful discriminatory impact.
ingenuous:

,,

The distinction is dis-

Los Altos was 97.9% white-- not unlike Arlington

- 8 -

Heights -- but CA 9 found it unnecessary to consider the
"historical context " once deciding the question of suspect
class.)
In sum, CA 7 has -- in the words of the DC -"extend[ed] the penumbra of the Fourteenth Amendment considerably beyond its present outer limits."
at 209.

373 F. Supp.,

The case merits a grant.
There is a response.

12/3/75

(

ME

~

./

•.

Hutchinson

Order and CA 7
Opinion in Petn.,
& reported at 373
F.Supp. 208 and
517 F.2d 409,
respectively.
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75-616

LFP/vsl
July 15, 1976

No. 75-616, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation, et al.

This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look at
the briefs,

is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will

refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study
of the case prior to argument and decision.

When an opinion is

expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative.

* * * *
Respondent, Metropolitan Housing Corporation, a nonprofit corporation organized to develop low income aousing in
the Chicago metropolitan area, entered into a purchase and lease
agreement with the Clerics of St. Vitor, a religious order, to
develop a housing project in Arlington Heights, a suburb of
Chicago.

The agreement covered fifteen (15) acres of land that

always had been zoned, R-3, single family.

Indeed, all of the

land surrounding the property in question was zoned R-3.

In order

to allow the proposed development, the fifteen acres would have
to be rezoned to R-5, muti-family.

The result would be fifteen

2.

No. 75-616

units per acre rather than four per acre under existing zoning.
Respondents applied for a zoning change.

After public

hearings, the planning commission recommended against the rezoning,
and the board of trustees of the Village voted 6-1 to deny the
request.

CA7 stated:
The apparent reason for the rejection was
that the property was in the middle of a
completely single-family area and would
not act as a buffer zone as required by
the comprehensive plan.
This suit was then instituted by respondent and three

individual plaintiffs.

They allege that the refusal to rezone

perpetuated segregation and constituted a denial of rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Acts, and the Fair
Housing Act.

Respondents sought a declaratory judgment and in-

j unctive relief.

Decisions Below
Although standing of respondents (plantiffs) was
challenged in the district court, that court "assumed" standing
and decided the merits.

The DC declined to certify any class.

As to what the evidence showed, the DC found that the
proposed multi-family housing development "would seriously damage
the value of the surrounding single-family homes and that its
presence in the area is strongly opposed by large groups of citizens
of the Village."

..

Even if citizen opposition was racially motivated,

No. 75-616

3.

the DC found that "the circumstantial evidence does not warrant
the conclusion that this motivated" the town authorities (petitioner):
The weight of the evidence proves that the
defendants were motivated with respect to
the property in question by a legitimate
desire to protect property values and the
integrity of the Village's zoning plan.
This is not an arbitrary or capricious act
in derogation of the plaintiff's Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
(Petition for cert, B-6).
The DC entered judgment for the Village.
CA7, by a 2-1 vote, reversed.

It concluded that "ul-

timate effect" of the refusal to rezone the property, and not
the motivation of the Village, was controlling.

That effect

would be to deny low-cost housing to "the poor," including a
substantial percentage of minority poor.
some

4~/o

It was estimated that

of the eligible applicants for the housing would be

black.
CA7 emphasized the · history of segregation infue Chicago
metropolitan area.

But although the population of Arlington Heights

was virtually all white, CA7 points to no discriminatory action
directed against minorities.

The majority opinion of CA7 does say

that Arlington Heights "has been ignoring what is essentially the
basic problem •

[and] it has been exploiting the problem by

allowing itself to become an almost

10~/o

white community."

CA7 concluded, without citation of any relevant authority,

4.
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and ignoring the Supreme Court decisions, that the compelling
state interest test applied, and held that the Village had failed
to show such an interest.
Judge Fairchild, dissenting, apparently accepted the
"compelling inte:r:est test," but disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that other economically feasible sights were not
available.

Judge Fairchild's opinion, like that of the majority,

is singularly devoid of analysis.

The Equal Protection Issue
CA7 erred in applying the compelling interest test.
There is no authority in this Court supporting the view that there
is a constitutional right to housing or any particular kind of
housing.

Although obviously of vital importance, housing is in

the same category constitutionally as welfare and education.
CA7, as well as respondent in its brief, ignores the
most relevant decisions of this Court:
416

u.s.

1; Lindsay v. Normat, 405

402

u.s.

13~

and Rodriguez, 411

u.s.

u.s.

Village of Belle Terre,
56; James v. Valtierra,

1.

This is essentially a zoning ordinance case which respondents have sought to test as a civil rights, equal protection
case.

The zoning ordinance of this Village appears to be typical

of zoning ordinances that have been sustained by the courts for
at least half a century.

No one contends that it is invalid on

s.
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its face, and the district court found as a fact that there was
no racial motivation in declining to rezone property that had
been zoned residential for many years.

As the court indicated

in Village of Belle Terre, zoning ordinances are sustained so long
as they are rationally related to a legitimate state objective.
If there was a discriminatory effect in this case, its
impact was primarily upon "the poor" and was not specifically
directed against the estimated

4~/o

black citizens who theoretically

constituted the market for the housing project.

Fair Housing and Civil Rights Acts
Although the complaint purported to rely on these
statutes, neither the DC nor CA7 addressed them.

The courts below

considered this case as an equal protection attack on the action
of the Village in refusing to rezone.
Although my consideration has been quite cursory, I
perceive no merit to the argument now being pressed by respondents
that one or more of these statues applies to the facts of this case.

standing
Although the courts below did not address the "standing"
issue, raised by the Village, it is not an insubstantial issue under
our decision in Warth v. Selvin.
have standing under Warth.

The individual respondents do not

I was inclined to think, , when we

granted cert, that Metropolitan Housing Corporation did have standing

•.
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6.

as it had a contract to purchase (and lease) the fifteen-acre
tract in question.

It can be argued, therefore, that a denial

of rezoning resulted in injury in fact.

Petitioner asserts, how-

ever, that under Illinois law, a contract Rurchaser of real estate,
whose contract is conditioned on rezoning (as in this

case~

has

no standing to challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance,
citing Clark Oil and Refining Corp. v. Evanston, 23 Ill. 2d 48.
My clerk should take a look at this case, and determine its
relevancy.

* * *
I believe the decision of CA7 is contrary to the great
weight of authority at the circuit court and district court levels,
and also is incompatible with several decisions of this Court.
Respondent's brief contains little assistance in terms
either of legal analysis or citation of authority.

Moreover, peti-

tioner's reply brief makes a fairly strong showing that respondent's
brief is inaccurate -- if not misleading -- in a number of respects.
The case is worrisome because one must recognize the
social and economic consequences of housing patterns that have
long prevailed in this country.

But in the absence of demonstrable

discriminatory state action, the solution of the problem is for
the legislative and executive branches.

aromt n tqt ~ttitt~ .itatt•
-rudtitt:!lbttt. ~. ar. 2llc?,.~

~tut:t

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

December 7, 1976

Re:

No. 75-616 - Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.

Dear Lewis:
I have read your proposed opinion with interest. I think
I am close to joining you, but I suggest the following for your
cons ide ration:

1.

I must confess that I am troubled by Ransom 1 s standing.
Perhaps what you have done is the best possible way to handle it.
Ransom•s situation, however, is thin. He lived in a 3-person household, with his mother and son, and their combined income was
apparently too high to qualify for Lincoln Green. He also testified
(page 324 of the transcript) that he never really sought housing in
Arlington Heights but that he would 11 probably 11 move to Lincoln Green
if it were built. I had hoped that plaintiff Maldonado would prove to
be a better subject for standing, but my hopes are not fulfilled. I
merely ask whether it would be better to go off on a jus tertii basis.
Certainly Craig v. Boren might be supportive of this.

/

j

2. I do not know whether the first part of the first sentence
of footnote 4 on page 6 is helpful. Undoubtedly, there was a good
reason for the change in district judges. The first was Judge Lynch,
who has since died.
3. I wonder about the accuracy of the first sentence of the
second paragraph in footnote 8 on page 9. Could it be reworded to
say, ••state law of standing does not govern such determinations in
federal courts••? I suggest this because I think federal standing
determinations can be controlled by state law as, for example, when
state law defines whether or not there is a legal injury.

tr1 (__

~n:pumt

Qiqmt of Urt ~tb i\tattg
'Jhtgqi:ttghttt. J. <q. 2ll~Jl."

I

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

December 9, 1976

Re:

No. 75-616 -- Arlington Hei~hts v. Metropolitan
Housing Deve opments Corp.

Dear Lewis:
I shall write separately in this case.

I

do not agree that the Court should reconsider the
applicable standard and then do the fact-finding
in the first instance.

I also have doubts about

standard you have fashioned.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

lfp/ss

20.

12/10/76

Arlington Heights (note 20, p. 17)

Proof that the decision by the Village was

motivated in party by a racially discriminatory purpose
would not necessarily have required invalidation of the
challenged decision.

Such proof would, however, have

shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the
same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible
purpose not been considered.

If this were established,

the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer
fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper
consideration of a discriminatory purposes.

In such

circumstances, there would be no justification for judicial
interference with the challenged decision.

But in this

case respondents failed to make the required threshold
showing.

12.

Proof that a decisionrnaking body was motivated

in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not
necessarily require
decision/

~~me&~

invalidation of the challenged

in every case.
But since respondents here failed to demonstaate

that a ax£ discriminatory purpose was a factor in petitioners'
decision, we have no occasion to determine what opportunity
a defendant should be

given,x~x~x~xexxkaxxaRxexxa~tixkea

factor is established, to prove that the decision would
have been xkexxamaxexeaxwixkEsxxexeR the same even if the
impermissible purpose had not been considered.

For a

scholarly exploration of these questions, see Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson!:

An Approach to the Problem of

Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev.
95, 116-118.

z () 1 p
~I ~~~J .J..~ ~ lc.J- ~
Arlinaton Heights ( ~

12/10/76

J~

~-.. ~~1/~

in

discriminatory purpose would not

that the same decision would have resulted even had the
impermissible purpose not been considered.

If this could

be established, the complaining party no longer fairly
could attribute the injury complained of to the government's
improper consideration of a racial purpose.

In such

circumstances, there would be no justification for judicial
interference with the challenged

decision~

The burden of

proof, however, would shift to the governmental agency
once it is shown that a discriminatory purpose existed.

I

\,,
I

'

.

lfp/ss

12/10/76

Arlington Heights

I
12.

~

Proof that a decision-making body was motivated

in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not
necessarily require invalidation of the challenged decision.
It would,however, require the decision maker to establish
that the same decision would have resulted even had the
impermissible purpose not been considered.

If this could

be established, the complaining party no longer fairly
could attribute the injury

~mplained

of to the government's
~

improper consideration of a racial purpose.

In such

circumstances, there would be no justification for judicial
interference with the challenged decision.

The burden of

proof, however, would shift to the government al
~

once it is shown that a discriminatory purpose

a~ncy~
~.

12.

Proof that a

decisionmakim~

body was motivated in part by

a racially discriminatory purpose would •ot
in~alidatio•

of the

challen~ed

decisio •

~~ require

Rather, it would be open

to the defendaats to show that the same decisio• would have resulted
even if the 11\permissible purpose had not beell co•sidered.

t.<AA.0.e>v-f\ ·, cJe)
some f fairly sbtpilt-"\~over•melllltal decisions, when
point

stron~ly

--~

toward the outcome reached, such

straightforward.

h

other factors

a showing

might be

But u the ki•d of multipurposed liwlrixioon11k•rxx

decision legislators frequently make,

balanci•~

a number of rather
'

indistinct competi•g co•siderations, it would be difficult to

tA-t.~~
establish that a•y single aa:hail!llsoel.t!actor was not of crucial importance.

See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem

of U•constitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95,

)e~~
116-118.

-1Wv-

If the - ~v.Pnaeata~~could not dischar~e ~Aburden

of proof, then a findi•g would follow that but for the consideration
of a constitutionally impermissible factor, the decisionmaker

~l~

would •ot have tak~ th~/\actio• . ~ f':!.aint:i:ff ooxpl1li~ . But •
~(YoM

if ~TR ·~•stablis~ that the same decision would have resulted,
of which
the plaintiff could •o lon~er fairly attribute the i•jury/he complains
to the government's improper consideration of a racial purpose.

~r~ P. S.
12/
- Proof that a decisionmaking body was motivated in part by
a racially discriminatory purpose would not automatically require invalidation of the challenged decision. Rather, it would be open to the
decisionmaker to show that the same decision would have resulted even
had the impermissible purpose not been considered. If this could be
established-- and the governmental body would carry the burden of
proof -- the plaintiff could no longer fairly attribute the injury he complains of to the government's improper consideration of a racial purpose.
In these circumstances the justification for judicial interference with
government decisionmaking would disappear. But if the government
could not discharge this burden of proof, then a finding would follow
that but for the consideration of a constitutionally impermissible factor,
the government would mt have taken the action of which plaintiff complains.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 14, 1976

75-616, Arlington Hgts v. Metro Housing
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 14, 1976

75-616, Arlington Hgts v. Metro Housing
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

December 14, 1976

Re:

No. 75-616 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

December /

No. 75-616 - Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your recirculation of December 14.

Sincerely,

-Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICEWM . J . BRE NNAN . JR .

December 29, 1976

.,

RE: No. 75-616 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
Dear Byron:·
I too would remand for the reasons stated in the first
two paragraphs of your dissent. However, I have some reservations about the third. Personally, I consider Lewis'
opinion to be a useful discussion of techniques for linking
discriminatory effect with discriminatory purpose, and consequently would not want to imply that I disagree with the
content of his discussion. Could you omit the third paragraph? If not, I'll file a short statement indicating that
I join paragraphs one and two of your opinion on the dispositional issue, while agreeing with Lewis' discussion of
the Subjects of proper inquiry .. that should guide the lower
court on remand.
11

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference
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C H AMBERS O F'

JUSTIC E WM . J . BRENNAN . JR.

December 29, 1976

RE: No. 75-616 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
Dear Byron:
I too would remand for the reasons stated in the first
two paragraphs of your dissent. However, I have some reservations about the third. Personally, I consider Lewis'
opinion to be a useful discussion of techniques for linking
discriminatory effect with discriminatory purpose, and consequently
would not want to imply that I disagree with the
(
content of his discussion. Could you omit the third paragraph? If not, I'll file a short statement indicating that
I join paragraphs one and two of your opinion on the dispositional issue, while agreeing with Lewis' discussion of
the "subjects of proper inquiry" that should guide the lower
court on remand.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

Ar hncrl-o r

HP~h+s

[Inc..

D~c.

I would suggest the following changes, none of which change
the basic thrust of your opinion.
(a) I am circulating an opLnLon in Mt. Healthy
School Dist. Bd. v. Doyle 1 No. 75-1278, which
discusses, albeit in a slLghtly different context,
the standards of proof required in order to
establish a constitutional violation based on
an impermissible purpose. Because I would not
want any arguable, if unwarranted, inference of
tension between that opinion and yours in this
case to be drawn, I would like to see your discussion of "substantial effect" modified to
explicitly note that it does not decide what
further proof standards might exist had a subs~ial purpose been shown.
The following two
change~, think, would accomplish this. First,
on page 2, rewrite the last full sentence to
read: "But racial discrimination is not just
another competing consideration." Second, on
page 18, after the first sentence add the following
footnote (numbered 21):

21/

--Since respondents have failed to demonstrate
that a discriminatory purpose was a substantial
factor in the zoning decision, respondents
ipso facto fail the Washington v. Davis standard. We need not determine what else respondents might have been required to establish
in order to make out a prima facie case of
discrimination or what opportunity petitioners
then should be given to rebut this prima facie
case.
(b) The first full paragraph on page 15 might be
taken to mean that, apart from questions of
privilege, trial testimony of decisionmakers is
available on the same basis as other sources of
legislative evidence. Because I believe our cases
establish that the placing of a decisionrnaker on
the stand, to probe his mental processes, is
presumptively to be avoided, I would suggest the
following additions. First, rewrite the second
sentence to read: ~ "In some extraordinary instances the members might be called to the stand
at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the
official action, although even then such testimony

s

-2-

frequently will be barred by privilege." Second,
add the following to the end of the first
sentence of footnote 18: " • • • other branches
of government ; and are 'not consonant with our
scheme of government,' Tenney v. Brandhove,
supra, at 377 , Placing a decisionmaker on the
stand is, therefore, 'usually to be avoided,'
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S.
,
; Un1te States v. Morgan,

313

u.s.

409, 422 (194

(c) As we have already discussed, I think the
concluding paragraph of the opinion might profitably be changed. I would suggest replacing the
second sentence of that paragraph with the following: "They continue to urge here that a zoning decision made by a public body may, and that
petitioners' action here did, violate §§ ~ 3604 or
3617." I would then rewirte the last sentence of
the paragraph so that it reads: "We remand the
case for further consideration of respondents'
statutory claims."
If you are able to make these changes, I would be
happy to join your opinion.

.iu:p-rtutt Qfltud of tqt ~nitt~ .itatts
~asJringhm. ~. <!f. 20:,?Jl.$
CHAMBERS Or

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

January 3, 1977

Re:

75-616

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation

Dear Lewis:
I am generally with you on the merits here,
but it seems that Byron makes a pretty good case for
remand rather than final decisions here.
I assume you
considered his view before you wrote. At your convenience
can you give me a call on this?
Regards,

{/il3
Mr. Justice Powell

c)--.
d

.Ju;vrtmt <!J~ud ~f tlft ~ttittb .itatte
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

/

January 6, 1977
Re:

75 - 616

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation

Dear Lewis:

I join even though I would be comfortable with Byron's
remand.
Regards,

t&t~
Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

January 7, 1977

~\"

Dear,;' Mr. Putzel:
,,
I~

c

The line-up in the
}

'I

Powell, ~J~, delivered the opinion of the Court,~, in which
'". ' _ iJ;_l"

''-'\{J.'

BUrger,n c.J., and Stewart, Blackmun and Rebnquist, JJ, join.
i.jo.,,

J;;-1

Marshall ,:z:·J

·•

filed an opinion concurring in Parts"";.:1-111
'

and dissenting from the result, in which Brennan,
Whi~e , ·~·~ :~,~ filed . a ~ 'd issenting
'

"'

J. ~

joined.

opinion.c . Stevens"; :'J ,:"; took

·!.'

he consideration or decision of the case.

.,,

lfp/ss

-

75-616 Villagp of Arlington Heights v.
Metroh-<itan Housing Development

1/10/77

The Respondent, a housing corporation, desired to
uild - in the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois,
a town house complex/ for low and moderate income tenants.
The Village, a suburb of Chicago, is zoned largely for
single family homes.

Its population is predominantly white.

Respondent negotiated a purchase agreement, covering
a 15-acre site, upon which it proposed to construct the
project.
and, the

But the Village authorities
V;ilJs.se-~aasd of

~~~~~
"'

Trus&ees - refused to rezone the

property from single-family/to~ milti-family clas sification.
Respondent, joined by individuals, instituted this
suit in an Illinois District Court.

They alleged that the

refusal to rezone was racially discriminatory, violating
the Fourteenth Amendmentj and the Federal Fa~r Housing Act.
Following trial, the District Court entered judgment
for the Village, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed.

Looking solely to the "ultimate effect")

the Circuit Court viewed the denial to rezone as
discriminatory.
In Washington v. Davis, decided last Term, we held
that official action is not invali; tsolely because it

~~·.y'
.
~~~ ~.Gt
'\result! l.n a "disproportionate effect. gr

j

mplil'1ot.

AProof

of • discriminatory intent is required to show a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.
In this case, the District Court found;lthat the refusal
to rezone~as based on legitimate ~-~e consideration(,;'

-

and was not racially motivated.

The Court of Appeals

agreed with this finding, but nevertheless held that the
"effect" of the refusal-fa.s determinative.
As this is not in accord with our

~Q&&at

decision in

Washington v. Davis, we reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
We remand the case for consiperation of the Fair
H~sing

-

If;.,~
••'"-"
Act claim, wbi sb atrJR.SI\
not
resolved by the Court

of Appeals.

I

Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan,
has filed an opinion concurring

~dissenting ~~~~-t.

in~~a ~I

Mr. Justice White filed

a dissenting opinion.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
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75-616 Vi ~lage of Arltington Rei ~hts
v. Metro Hous :i..ng Develop .
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January 21, 1977

CHAM BE RS OF"

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

f\LE. coP'f
-PLEASE RETURN
10 f\LE

Case held for No. 75-616, Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
No. 75-1002, Joseph Skilken & Co. v. City of Toledo
Petitioner Skilken, a developer, arranged with the local
housing authority to build three federally subsidized Turnkey
III public housing projects on various sites throughout
Toledo, outside of the areas of high minority concentration.
Before it could proceed it had to petition the city council
for rezoning of one site, Heatherdown, and it had to obtain
from the plan commission platting approval at the other two
sites. Apparently, similar requests in the areas involved
(albeit not for public housing) had generally been approved,
and in fact the plan commission gave preliminary platting
approval at one site. Then word got out that Skilken proposed
to build public housing, and the reaction from residents of
nearby areas was strong. After hearings, the relevant
authorities de nied rezoning and platting approval. In the
process they rescinded the preliminary approval given for
one of the sites.
Skilken, joined by the housing authority and two
individual minority plaintiffs, sued the city and several
of its officials, alleging that the city's actions were
racially motivated. They charged violations of §§ 1981, 1982 and
1983, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The DC found that the city's actions
were racially motivated, but, confusingly, the DC also spoke
at times as though its only important finding was a finding
of racially discriminatory effect. It ordered that the city

.
'

- 2 -

permit construction at the three sites. It further ordered
that the city file within 90 days a comprehensive plan "to
eliminate discriminatory barriers in the total housing
supply." This order was apparently based on a rather muted
finding that the city had engaged in a consistent pattern of
discrimination with respect to public housing, causing nearly
all of it to be located in the areas of the city with a heavy
minority concentration. It is not clear whether the DC's
action is based on statutory or constitutional grounds.
CA6 (Weick, Miles (DJ); Phillips, concurring in the
result), reversed in an opinion that is not easy to follow.
Without explicitly stating that any of the DC's findings were
clearly erroneous, it expressed strong disapproval of the
order for the city to come up with a comprehensive plan. It
then vacated and remanded with resgect to the two denials of
platting approval, because the DC 'did not give adequate
consideration to the nonracial reasons stated by the Plan
Commission and the City Council," and did not consider "the
rights of these areas' property owners who opposed the
platting." CA6 reversed outright and ordered dismissal of
the complaint with respect to Heatherdown'srezoning, , apparently
because it thought that ordering rezoning amounted to usurping
the local legislative powers. Petitioners based their suit
on a charge of racially discriminatory motivation, and the
DC held for them, at least in - part, on this basis. It is not
clear to what extent the CA reversal represents a disagreement
with this factual finding.
In any event, the DC's decision on remand with regard
to the two sites denied platting approval should proceed in
accordance with the guidelines set forth in Arlington Heights.
Those guidelines call for a somewhat different inquiry from
what CA6 has mandated. - In addition, the order of dismissal
with respect to Heatherdown. was probably erroneous. It too
should be reconsidered in light of Arlington Heights. I will
vote to grant, vacate and remand to permit that reconsideration.
Petitioners have also pressed their claim that the DC
was correct in entering its broad remedial order. The CA
seems ~ to ~ have thought that such orders were permissible only
in school desegregation cases. Hills -v. Gautreaux, 44 L.W.
4480, should disabuse them of that notion. Although I have
strong doubts whether such relief was appropriate on the facts
of this case, the CA apparently acted on a sweeping and erroneous
basis. I recommend that any remand also specify reconsideration
in light of Gautreaux.

1-.1/

L.F.P., Jr.
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LFP/lab

11/17/76

To:

Dave Martin

From:

L. F. P. , Jr.

75-616

Village of Arlington Heights

This memorandum will comment on your draft
opinion of 11/16, that I have found quite interesting.
For the most part my comments are general rather than
specific, as I would like for you to put portions of
the opinion through a second draft.

You can do this

much better than I.
1.

You will note some editorial changes,

primarily on the first twenty pages.

No "editing" at

this stage is final, and editorial improvement by you
and your colleague "editor" -- will of course be welcomed.
2.

Part I looks fine, subject to the limited

editing I have suggested.
3.

Part II, dealing with standing, is excellent.

Apart from quite minor editing, I see no need for change.
4.

I would like for you to rewrite most of

Part III, primarily with the view to condensing it to
about half its present length.

Try writing it with the

conciseness and specificity of a Law Review note.

2.

*

*

*

I now make some specific observations that
may afford some guidance.
PP 22, 23.

On these pages, you summarize the

teaching of our prior cases, noting that circumstantial
evidence may compel a finding of purpose, and that even
a single action may be so invidious as to violate Equal
Protection.

It is important to distill and state the

principles that may be deduced from prior cases.

Perhaps

this could be done more concisely.
I suggest greater reliance on Washington v.
Davis, possibly quoting from it in the text or a note.
PP. 23-26.

In these pages you were identifying

relevant evidence or considerations.
included:

The points made

(i) that "ultimate effect" is an "important

starting point", but effect alone is rarely determinative.
(P. 23); (ii) that the "sequence of events" leading to
an official decision may shed light (PP. 23, 24); (iii)
that the sequence of events may be viewed in a "broader
sense", citing Mulkey

(P. 24); (iv) that direct evidence

in the form of contemporary statements by officials may
be relevant (PP. 25, 26); (v) that direct testimony by

3.

"decision makers" (legislators) may be helpful, but there
are various negatives as well as constitutional constraints
(26, 27).
I have no disagreement with any of the foregoing, although my impression is that the relevant
considerations can be summarized quite concisely.
also are almost too obvious to state,

~'

Some

contemporary

statements by officials.
Two pages (26, 27) are devoted to the possible
relevancy and admissibility of testimony by the decisionmakers.

What you have written is excellent, and would

be entirely suitable for a Law Review.

I think the

substance should be included in our opinion, but in
condensed form and possibly relegated to a footnote.
The "awesome" paragraph on p. 28 can be omitted.
5.

Subpart D of Part III decides the case.

The principles identified earlier in the opinion are
applied to the facts.
At first reading, this part of the opinion seems
a bit thin.

After stating that the courts below made no

finding of discriminatory purpose or intent, the draft
simply states that we have reviewed the evidence, and
find no basis for overturning the findings of the courts
below.

At this point, at least there should be a footnote

4.
reference back to the discussion of the evidence in
Part I.

As an alternative, consider the possibility of

amplifying that paragraph by summarizing in a few
sentences the more pertinent evidentiary facts:

this

property had been zoned R-3 since 1959; it was virtually
surrounded by single family homes; the owners of these
homes had built or purchased them in reliance on the
single family residence classification; the proposed
rezoning would cause a diminishment of property values;
the purpose of R-5 zoning was to serve as a buffer between
single family development and commercial or manufacturing
land use, a purpose that would not be served by rezoning
the Lincoln Green tract to R-5.
Thus, not only was there no substantial evidence
of discriminatory purpose or intent; there was rather strong
affirmative evidence to the contrary.
I am not entirely sure that a summary (along
the foregoing lines) is desirable in this final section.
But it might be helpful to give it a try, and see how
it looks.
6.

Although I have not examined all of the

footnotes critically, they seem generally to be in good
shape.

I do suggest that you ask yourself, with respect

to each, whether (i) the note serves a clarifying or
other useful purpose, and (ii) whether, in the case of

5.

several of the longer notes, they could be condensed
without impairing their usefulness.

I shy away from

too much dicta or free wheeling in notes.

*

*

*

I am not on any crusade for shorter opinions
and less fullsome footnotes.

I do think the Court is

fairly subject to some criticism (not all of it) on
account of the length of our opinions and the multiplicity
of the notes.

What our critics sometimes overlook is

that we are the Supreme Court; we have a responsibility
to make law as well as decide particular controversies,
and this requires careful analysis and appropriate
elaboration.

such an opinion can and should be different

from an essay or Law Review article.
I add these comments for the benefit of all
of us, including particularly myself.

Your draft is not

fairly subject to this general criticism.

*

*

*

Now, as to the next steps for this opinion:
please write a fresh draft of Subpart A of Part III.

You

might also make such changes in Subpart B thereof as you
think desirable.

6.

Meanwhile, one of the secretaries can recopy
the few pages in your first draft that I have edited
substantially.

This will give us a relatively clean

copy of the first twenty pages.
It would be extremely helpful if you could
give me the revised Part III by Saturday morning.

I

would then be able to get this back to you by Monday,
with the hope that it could go to your "editor" early
next week, and possibly to the printer for a Chambers
draft before Thanksgiving.

L. F. P. , Jr.

LFP/lab

11/17/76

To:

Dave Martin

From:

L.F.P., Jr.
75-616 Village of Arlington Heights
This memorandum will comment on your draft

opinion of 11/16, that I have fouo.d quite interesting.
For the most part my c011111ents are general rather than
specific, as I would like for you to put portions of
the opinion through a second draft.

You can do this

much better than I.
1.

You will note some editorial changes,

primarily on the first twenty pages.
this stage is final, and editorial

No "editing" at

~provement

by you --

and your colleague "editor" -- will of course be welcomed.
2.

Part I looks fine, subject to the

l~ited

editing I have suggested.
3.

Part II, dealing with standing, is excellent.

Apart from quite minor editing, I see no need for change.
4.

I would like for you to rewrite most of

Part III, primarily with the view to condensing it to
about half its present length.

Try writing it with the

conciseness and specificity of a Law Review note •

.
.~

2.

*
I now make some specific observations that
may afford some guidance.
PP 22 1 23.

On these pages, you summarize the

teaching of our prior cases, noting that circumstantial
evidence may compel a finding of purpose, and that even

~

a single action may be so invidious as to violate Equal
,Protection.

It is important to distill and state the

principles that may be deduced from prior cases.

Perhaps

this could be done more concisely.
I suggest greater reliance on Washington v.
Davis, possibly quoting from it in the text or a note.
PP. 23-26.

In these pages you were identifying

relevant evidence or cons ide rations.
included~'

The points made

(i) that "ultimate effect'' is an "important

starting point", but effect alone is rarely determinative.
(P. 23); (ii) tbat the "sequence of events" leading to
an official decision may shed light (PP. 23, 24); (iii)
that the sequence of events may be .viewed in a "broader
sense", citing Mulkey
in the

fo~

(P. 24); (iv) that direct evidence

of contemporary statements by officials may

be relevant (PP. 25, 26); (v) that direct testimony by

•.

3.

I have no disagreement with any of the foregoing, although my impression is that the relevant
considerations can be summarized quite concisely.
also are

a~st

too obvious to state,

~,

Some

contemporary

statements by officials.
Two pages (26, 27) are devoted to the possible
relevancy and admissibility of testimony by the decisionmakers.

What you have written is excellent, and would

be entirely suitable for a Law Review.

I think the

substance should be included in our opinion, but in
condensed form and possibly relegated to a footnote,
The "awesome" paragraph on p. 28 can be omitted.
5.

Subpart D of Part III decides the case.•

The principles identified earlier in the opinion are
applied to the facts.
At first reading, this part of the opinion seems
a .bit thin.
finding of
s~ply

After stating that the courts below made no
discr~inatory

purpose or intent, the draft

states that we have reviewed the evidence, and

find no basis for overturning the findings of the courts
below.

At this point, at least there should be a footnote

'·,

_.

·~

4.
' .

!'~

,.

reference back to the discussion of the evidence in
Part I ;

As an alternative, consider the possibility of

amplifying that paragraph by suumarizing in a few
sentences the more pertinent evidentiary facts:
~ property

~

' .,
this

had bee·n zoned B.-3 since 1959; it was virtually

surrounded by single family homes; the owners of these
homes had built or purchased them in reliance on the
single family residence classification; the proposed
rezoning would cause a dLminishment of property values;
·the purpose of R-5 zoning was to serve as a buffer between
single family development and commercial or manufacturing
·.land use, a purpose that would not be sened by rezoning
the Lincoln Green tract to R-5.
Thus, not only was there no substantial evidence

·of discriminatory purpose or intent; there was rather strong
~

affirmative evidence to the contrary.
am not entirely sure that a sUDID8ry (along
' the foregoing lines) is desirable in this final section.
But it might be helpful to give it a try, and see how
looks.
6.

Although I have not examined all of the

footnotes critically., they seem generally to be in good
shape.

I do suggest that you ask yourself, with respect

to each, whether (1} the note serves a clarifying or ';,
other useful purpose, and (ii) whether, in the case of

.·

5.

several of the longer notes, they could be condensed
without impairing their usefulness,

I shy away from .

too much dicta or free wheeling in notes.

*

*

*

on any crusade for shorter opinions
and less fullsome footnotes.

I do think the Court is

fairly subject to some criticism (not' all of it) on
account of the length of our opinions and the multiplicity
o~

the notes.

What our critics sometimes overlook is

that we .!!.!. the Supreme Court; we have a responsibility
·to make law as well as decide particular controversies,
and this requires careful analysis and appropriate
elaboration.

Such an opinion can and should be different

from an essay or Law Review article.
,I

add these comments for the benefit of all

of us, including particularly myself.

Your draft is not

fairly subject to this general criticism.

*

*

*

Now, as to the next steps for this opinion:
please write a fresh draft of Subpart A of Part III.

You

might also make such changes in Subpart B thereof as you
think desirable.

6.
l'

v ·>" Meanwhile, one of the secretaries can recopy

the few pages in your first draft that I have edited
substantially. :,This will give us a relatively clean
copy of the first twenty pages.
·:. I~ , ~ould

be extremely helpful if you could

give me the revised Part III by Saturday morning. '".I
would then be able to get this back to you by Monday,
with the hope that it could go to your "editor" early
next ,week, and possibly to the printer for a Chambers
draft before Thanksgiving.

L.F.P., Jr.
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BENCH MEMO
To: Mr. Justice Powell
From:

October 11, 1976

Dave Martin
No. 75-616, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., et al.

This is in many respects a sensitive case.

Zoning has often

been used with the decided effect, if not the purpose, of
fostering racially segregated housing patterns.

Here a

suburb with less than 1% black population refused to rezone
a tract to accommodate what seems to be a well-designed,
unoffensive townhouse development.

The development would

have been within reach of low- and moderate-income families,
'
and s howed promise
of axxxagkiRgxa creating a reasonably
integrated townhouse community.
I conclude that respondent MHDC has standing, that CA7
was wrong in its constitutional conclusion, and that the
Fair Housing Act questions are not presented here and should
not be decided.
Standing
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, presented a standing question
somewhat similar to that here.
to lack standing, but the

g

Allf plaintiffs there were found

Court

e~kaxixeaxxkaxxHKHailJxkke

intimated that litigants who surmoun~the standing barrier will
be those who focus on a particular project.
516.

-

Id. at 508 n. 18,

Here MHDC clearly had a specific project in the works.

It sought clearance through the normal channels and brought
suit only when those efforts failed.

It would lack standing

only if,-. like f Penfield Better Homes in Warth, its project

-2was no longer viable at the time the suit was filed.
are the relevant dates:
xa~

rezoning.

These

Jan. 29, 1971, MHDC petitioned for

March, April, and June, 1971, public hearings

on the proposal.

Sept. 28, 1971, final decision by the

Arlington Heights Board rejecting the rezoning.

Jure 12, 1972,

complaint filed.
Penfield Better Homes' project was denied in 1969, and
the

'ts Warth lawsuit was filed in 1972.

The Court siid

that it was possible that Better Homes had standing in 1969,
"or within a reasonable time thereafter" to seek review of
~ "1.. cJ ..t.) "-'\ S'l7.
the towns action.~But plaintiffs there had failed to allege
that the project remained viable at the time xskax the complait
was filed, and nothing in the record suggested that a live
dispute survived into 1972.

The real

uestion here is whether

--

the nine months MHDC waited to file suit constitutes a
"reasonable time thereafter," since MHDC did not allege
or put on specific proof as to continued viability.
I think the time was reasonable.
;"'

t:X~

that MHDC tr e

The complaint reveals

v.J...--sv,;~~ ~c-k.tr~~

si~~

to cooperate with local officials after

rejection of rezoning at the St. Viator's property.•
etsher

swi~a-ele

6~-a

rnopu!'ey .. It also indicates that the Village

Board had a Study Committee on Low-Moderate Income Housing

'!+

'-.)4$ ....

t-

\.AA\'f~tc..

-toY ~PC
-tT>

~+

which reported to the Board in March, 1972,

~ resCA/~

development of 150 to 250

0~ 'IWs~.

of these ongoing efforts, and in the absence of any real
indication that the project xamaiRaaxxiakia lost viability,
I do not think nine months was an unreasonable delay.
The DC opinion ax (Petn. at B6-B7) suggests another deficiency.
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The project MHDC intended to build required supplemental federal
funding under Section 236.

The DC noted that by the time it

decided the case (February 1974), Section 236 funds had been
impounded by the executive branch.

Petitioner suggests that

this deprives MHDC of standing, but I think this contention
confuses mootness and standing doctrine.

The relevant inquiry

\ for standing purposes should be the project's viability at the
time the complaint is filed.

As I understand it, Section 236

funds were not impounded until late 1972 or early 1973, in
the wave of impoundmants that greeted President Nixon's
ree1Etion.

These impoundments were hotly disputed in the

courts for several months thereafter.

The point is that

the funds were still ostensibly available in June of 1972.
(I have not verified the dates of the impoundments; if that
information is crucial, let me know and I will check it.)

A(~

Petitioner also suggests that under Illinois law respondent
MHDC lacks standing, and cites Clark Oil and Refining Corp.
v. Evanston, 23 Ill.2d 48.

The plaintiff there entered into

a contract to purchase land for use as a gas station.
contract was contingent on securing rezoning.

The

Noting that

plaintiff had no present possessory interest, and that it was
not really hurt if it never secured rezoning (the contract wouad
simply be' rescinded), the Illinois court held that plaiatiff
lacked standingJ

io cLJI~ -. 2o"'i~ ~oArJ d-ecisiD"'\ ~"' -k !ll;~o•'s ~""~·

I do not think Clark Oil controls here.

That was a commercial

setting, and the constellation of interests are
MHDC is not
..____

s~ply

trying to make money.

\ If\ OW"

~""'·

differentA~,.~~

It wants to put up

-

good quality low- and moderate-income housing in

te.lcd-llft(y
theAsegregate~d

-4suburbs.

Moreover, if it loses the St. Viator's property,

it probably cannot find an equally attractive purchase
elsewhere.

In fact, the key to the

be that St.Viator's was subsidizing the
HR

especially low sales price.

ma~XR8kx»exa~le

seems to

~litigation

a effort

through an

Without that subsidy, MHDC

is apparently unable to put up the kind of

housing it wants within the low- to moderate-income range.
I have found no Illinois case that relates to this kind of
nonprofitf setting, and petitioner cites none.
Clark Oil is thus fairly easily distinguishable, but in
any event I see no reason why state standing doctrine should
control access to federal courts.

The Article III requirements

and the general prudential concerns which have shaped
standing doctrine in this eourt are peculiarly federal matters.
If Illinois wants to restrict zoning litigation to owners
and immediate
or others with clear/possessory interests, its desires do
not necessarily carry over into the federal system.

I

think MHDC ha!? shown injury in fact.
:r~ X .-. .,.,·r.*; ......w,, 4ltt....o~o~~;~
~Agets MHDC over the ititial Article III hurdle, and
MHDC can assert its own rights to be free from arbitrary
zoning under Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365.
is obvious)y not the heart of the controversy, and
Arlington Heights clearly prevails under Euclid.

But that
~exixi~Rexx

MHDC wants

to complain about action allegedly motivated by racial
discrimination.

In this, as a constitutional matter, it

must be said that MHDC asserts the rights of thtrd parties:
those nonwhites who would move in to Linc$ln Green,. saa

••us

;~

~

~,.

'iR9

right to be free of governmental action undertaken for
f\
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racially discriminatory motives.

Whether

MliDC

~kcan

these third party rights is a close question.

assert

The precedents

give no clear guidance.
It would be fairly easy to find that MHDC cannot assert
third-party rights.

......____

Under the plurality view in Singleton v .

Wulff (July 1, 1976), MHDC loses under the first test:

there

is no confidential relationship approaching that between
doctor and patient.

Nor are there .-.. practical concerns

like a desire for anonymity or the certainty of imminent
,).,·,~

technical mootness which might

~Athe v~ctims

of the racially

discriminatory action from bringing their own suit.
But ±fx8RKxMx under your approach in Singleton, and taking
a more rellistic view of the obstacles facing black;-victims
of discriminatory action, I would argue that MHDC should be
permitted to assert the third-party rights.

In the first place,

I think the concept of'tlirect :illlli interdiction" should be
broad enough to include this case.

Unlike the doctors in

~ingleto~

MHDC is not simply out of pocket a bit more if petitioner's
~k$'+-..J.
decision stands up. It is)\absolutely barred from building the
housing it wants.

If it goes ahead to break ground, I presume

it is subject to injunction. If it still persists, I
it and
presume/its officers and employees are subject to contempt
sanctions .
Secondly, in an important sense,

li~igation

Lfr~~J

of the third

~,(

parties' rights is in all p au&teahttJEerrns imposs~ble without
the action of someone like MHDC who will go to the trouble to
put together a specific project.
zoning ordinance in 1959.

Arlington Heights adopted its

If it could be proved that ~ ~

ordinance was motivated by a desire to keep out blacks, then

-6the ordinance
xx ~would be declared invalid, and presumably the court would

create a remedy to dissipate the unconstitutional results.
:~s.u.

But for someone to litigate thatf-now, he would have to demonstrate
standing

&I

i by pointing to a specific project or building

or house iR:KB191'hitdmiMtBHIHian•mmnuw which would be built
(1\.:.'i ,,.:k /e .. st1
i~ Wl.'f ye.J.\~
e:l~ I,Jc).~tl,

absent the ordinance und into which he would move.

Or--and

this is the more likely scenario now that the 1959 adoption is
history--Arlington Heights might be turning down all new

~~~

rezoning proposals

~e£auxexafxxa£ialxmaxxxaxiaH

discriminatory purposes.

for racially

But . . again no individual could

challenge this policy until someone put together a specific
proposal presented to the Board.

In each instance the individuals

-

are dependent on the actions of a developer •. More importantly,
'('~~.'\

even when such a project exists, there . . .~evere problems
in proving that an individual would probably move into
the completed project.

For any project in litigation,
fltNwl~ +o ~ i~-h> &~ ~ ~ewf.:tiiv~ pv-o,itc.f
completion is many years away, and futureA~vee ef ~ka~ ee~
~"""\

can not be demonstrated with much ••
"-"

To these reasons t

iaa·

• certainty.

(which I confess are
the
defmnitely arguable extrapolations ofASingleton dissent) I
add one more.

1

1

1 •tHM.e

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257, in

language quoted with approval in the Singleton dissent, found
the general rule against asserting third parties' rights
outweighed by" the need to protect fundamental rights."
as in Barrows
The same fundamental rights/are at stake here. As a practical
matter they can only be protected if a developer with a
particular proposal is in the picture.

I think it makes

sense to let the developer assert them himself in his own
action.
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pro~f

were defective under Warth standards.

went to trial before Warth.)

(xf The case

The local community organization\

Northwest Opportunity Center, fails for similar reasons.

It has demonstrated no injury in fact to xi itself or its
members, insofar as the constitutional claim;r is concerned.
The Fair Housing Act is a different matter.
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S.
205, held that the Act extends standing to a very broad
class of persons who come within the statutory definition
.i.·.!·)

of "persons aggrieved-l"
in~ured

"C~J""

who claims to have been

by a discriminatory housing practice or who believes

that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing
practice that is about to occur • • • "42 U.S.C. § 3610(a).)
MHDC clearly qualifies.

Some of the others might also.

The Constitutional Issue
The rationale nf 7 ':'l. adopted by CA 7 is not easy to follow,
but I think it must be said that CA7 passed only on the
constitutional issues

aRRXR~xxaRxkkH~

(specifically under

the J:t' ourteenth Amendment) and not on the Fair Housing Act
claims.

The suit was brought under that act and §§1981, 1982,

and 1983, as well as directly under the Fourteenth Amendment.
tH. \Ue~ -+o ~y 'fa ~e..s~ CA7's /.'""-« •f n:aS'~~·
AvA7 first accepted the DC's finding that there was no racially

r;, fir~"'~ i+ wil\

discriminatory purpose animating the refusal to rezone.

Then

it apparently accepted the finding that there was no discriminatory

-8-

effect, citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, despite the
fact that knocking out low-income housing would have a

~ ~
k.,w.w-e.r,
disproportionate effect on minorities. Ai at i& went onJ and
Colll<Sf\~*'~ violation
A.
finally found a ai.S£xKmXRa .I!IX~XI! 1!£X based on "historical

context and ultimate
effect." It took note of the strikingly
.... .._..
segregated housing pattern in the northwest Chicago area.
~

And it found that the ultimate effect would be that no
Section 236 housing would be built in Arlington Heights, since
there were no suitable alternative sites.

This meant the

Village killed a chance to increase its minority population
by 1000 percent.

In addition, although Arlington Heights

"did not directly create the problem," it was not
entitled to ignore the problem.

The village was likened

to the builder in Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.~501
(CA .., "?tf) ~. ~~I"'' v.s. 10 10,
F.2d 32~,~wkex~xxkex.s who, taking plaintiff's case there at
its strongest,"exploited" the segregated housing market to
make excessive profits from black
From this reasoning the

bu~ers.

E~Hr..Kx£X£SR

court concluded that

Arlington Heights' action could be sustained only if based

I

on compelling interests.

Clearly the stated interests--

integrity of the zoning plan (using multifamily units only

as buffers against industrial and

comme~al

developments)

and protecting property values--could not pass that stringent
test.
A.

It is hard to put before you strong arguments .._ in

support of CA7's decision.
to a sleight of hand.

Analytically it seems to amount

The DC is approved:

forbidden purpose or effect.

there is no

But suddenly, with talk of

'(ultimate effect'" and "exploitation;' the village is put to the

-9compelling interest. test.
In the long run, however, there is something to be said
often
for what the court did. Zoning ordinances have/been ~Hkxka

xke used to excluae racial minorities.
ment acts thus, the

action~----

When the g±k¥ govern-

is more offensive and

damaging than when private parties discriminate.

But when the

government takes an action a for discriminatory reasons, it

-+o

~U~

is often less

accessible~than

individuals.

Under Washington v. Davis (June 7, 1976), govern-

comparable actions by private

ment action will not be struck down--on constitutional grounds-because of discriminatory effect.
be shown.

•

Bad purpose must

And yet, for a number of good reasons, courts

kaxexxex±xxeax since Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, have

--

resisted -..intrusive inquiryf into legislative motivation.

....

Under

decision.

And almost any zoning action, no matter how

suspicious-looking, can also claim some kind of rational
basis such as preserving property values.
is, in some respects, !lfi'

b

Zoning case law

tailor-made to permit the

e

"ins"

an impenetrable cover for keeping the "outs" out.! /Perhaps on
income lines this is tolerable.
not.

Zoning could be

But on racial lines it is

~~important

factor in propelling

Jrh:&::i:x llihi c h )
us toward the society against wk±k~the Kerner Commission

warned:

two separate nations, one black, one white.

Unless

courts open their eyes to what nearly all others can see,
such results are facilitated.

(1 N. Williams, American Land

-10Planning Law~&Jiens 85-111, contain~s some useful xkaHgkx.s:-._

if slightly slanted--thoughts on this.

LJH\\A""t<J

-.Aargues that Euclidean

deference to local agencies has gone too far, in disregard of
the _.powerful exclusionary potential of the zoning tool.

A number of state courts, notably New f Jersey, are ushering
in a new era of heightened scrutiny, largely by interpretation
of the "general welfare" requirements under state constitutions.)
B. The general argument offered above in support of CA7
That argument contains
ultimately will not wash. !ka.s:axaxe/reasons for permitting

1asxaa.s:iax plaintiffs an easier prima facie «a.s:a showing of
bad motive.

But

;t

~~really

cannot carry the day in the face

of an approved and explicit finding that there was no
discriminatory purpose.

Arlington Heights has so few

minority residents that one still may be uneasy about the
finding.

But this was a refusal to rezone, not a hurry-up

-------'-"'""""

effort to place a multi-family area int a park zone for the
first time, therebv to block a proposed low-income development.
Cf. Kenneda Park Homes v. Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (CA2 1970)6l
cert denie , 401 U.S. 1010;
CA.rt ~~J '/2-'L v.s. lol/2-·
AUnited Staas v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 1 ~ Arlington Heights
on the property
had called for single-family development/long before anyone
proposed Lincoln Green.
All
,then,
~/we really have/is a refusal to permit low-income
housing, a refusal explainable on rational grounds.

&./os-u.s.

rJ.)

~''

v..s. 1,

Valtierra,

Lindsey v. Normet,.kand Rodriguez,Ashould govern.
One last thought leads in to considering the statutory

&RRRR«&a Zoning powers do carry great potential for subtly
perpetuating or worsening residential segregation.

I think

the way should be open for Congress to change the lttigation
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burdens somewhat, in pursuance of its enforcement powers under
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.

What I have in

mind is something like the.,.• • shift in burden of proof
upon a prima facie showing under Title VII, as in Griggs v.
Power Co •
'{II
DukeJ 401 U.S. ~Zo/, and McDonnell Douglas v. Green,~~ U.S.

7 Cf .2.

This might be coupled with a i?f

.._ that a

· ·

l

;::;;;r&:;s'4~~cation

rather modest showing will constitute a

prima facie case, of the kind Congress attempted in tre
religious axi discrimination provision at issue in Parker
Seal.

Washington v. Davis, drawing a sharp distinction

between constitutional claims ana statutory claims, supports

t~viewJ~ ~

"'-..$ ~~ k.;w{

~ ~~e~ ~v-,·y.

If Congress passes such legislation, there is some' danger
that courts, at least in some communities, will wind up
sitting as glorified zoning boards of appeals.

But4J if the

\A)()~~

problem ofAresidential segregation warrants such action, and
if Congress wills it, then~hat should not be disturbing.

At

,jiAL4eiiA{

the point when thatArole becomes too burdensome, Congress can
end it.

The problem with.._ CAl's decision here is that it

precipi~es

J.J

~

d~

the courts into that role on a very thin foundation,

and there is little way that Congress or an aroused public
can pull the courts

ou~

a constitutional matter.

once such widespread review begins as

Fair Housing Act
The major remaining question is whether Congress has
already established Title Vii-like bnrden-shifting rules in
the Fair Housing Act.

A superficial look at the language

of the statute suggests that it has not, but one must keep
in mind that Griggs and McDonnell Douglas construed provisions
which on their faces likewise did not

~~t:~

·•••Aburden of proof.

None of the language of the Fair Housing Act deals explicitty

-12with zoning decisions.

~'Uj

Some of the language

i~~broad

enough

ta thsas ts 11G ts l · st sf shtftt g tardeZEw
to res ondents comes 1
360 (a), making it unlawful ~''!~Jo
refuse to sell or rent • . • or otherwise make unavailable

sew

or deny, a

S.u. o.lse>
;~. § 3f.l7.

-

dwelling to any person because of race, color,
..... ~ .C:......\ (.~""'""' of 3"0'! (~)
religion, or national origin." ButA•' m!.x~x.s:.tut:.Kii!!Rx.s:ugge.s:x.s:

s

w...-.e,

\; \u.. ~ -C\wl:~

1

3

3

,

suggests that an explicit finding>Aof no racially

discriminatory motivation would also defeat a Fair Housing
Act claim.
cites
CA7 MeRKif!IR.S:/the leading case for application of the Act
to._• • zoning practices, United States v. Black Jack,
508 F.2d 1179.

I.

~~~A)

That case establishes a kind of burden-shifting

procedure roughly like Griggs and McDonnell Douglas, although
find its analysis not very helpful.

There

I may be the

kernel of a workable statutory interpretation there, but it
is not well developed.

BlackJrack builds on Williams v.
tart ~CZ, "''' u.s. I 02.1, 102.7,.~
Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (CAB 1974),Awhich does a good
\
''
Me :bo lo\1111-l
job of applying the notion of prima facie case (as in flppg)
A.

to discrimination by a private developer.

But the Black Jack

court j l J ·jumps too quickly to a compelling interest
under
test/which any municipality is I
2$ likely to lose.
3

My ultimate point ~ere is that this is not a good case
to construe the Fair Housing Act as applied to zoning decisions.
I think the question is not

More importantly,
before ....

us.

---

-

CA7 touched on some Fair Housing Act questions,

--- --- -

but its decision, fairly read, goes off on constitutional
grounds alone.
questions.

f

-

The petition presents only constitutional

Respondent tries to work in Fair Housing Act

;.... ·.+-s

lot-i~

points whenAit restates the questions

presented)~•

·

?

•

&;
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but obviously that does not suffice.

The answer to the statutory

interpretation question is not so clear that we ought to
decide it when it was not fully considered in the court
. . below and when it has not been . . . adequately presented
or briefed here.
I would reverse on the constitutional questions and
remand for consideration of respondents' other claims.

D.M.

footnotes
1.

There is not necessarily

the usual political process.
segregated, there will

xaaii~

af

corrective available through

If the community is fH sufficiently
be no «8RXkikHk real constituency

pushing for the needed changes.

Cf.

~an

Antonio School

Dj§trict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28: concluding that there
was no class there which could be called suspect, the Court
alleged
emphasized that the/class was not "relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritirian political process."
is not to
This aaaxxRax/imply that all zoning decisions should be
subject to strict scrutiny.

It does suggest, however, that

the extreme deference mandated by Euclid and Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, should be tempered in appropriate
cases by a realization of the strong, but subtle, exclusionary
potential of the zoning device. Perhaps there is some kind
showing
of prima facie «axe/that should propel a court into closer
obtains
scrutiny than/under Euclid.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 75-616
Village of Arlington Heights
ET AL., Petitioners,

On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States
v.
Court of Appeals for
Metropolitan Housing Development
the Seventh Circuit ..
Corporation et al.
[December -, 1976]

MR. JuSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court ..
In 1971 respondent Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation (MHDC) applied to petitioner, the Village oi
Arlington Heights, Ill., for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel
from single-iamily to multiple-family classification. Using
federal nnancial assistance, MHbC planned to build 190
clustered townhouse units for low and moderate income
tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC,
joined by other plaintiffs who are also respondents here,
brought suit in the United States bistrict Court for theNorthern District of Illinois. 1 They alleged that the denif.l,l
was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia,
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq. Following a bench trial,
the District Court entered judgment for the Village, 373 F.
Supp. 208 (1974), and respondents appealed. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed , finding that the"ultimate effect" of the denial was racially discriminatory,
1

OEP 2 1976

Respondents named as defendants both the VtllagC' and IL number of
its officials, sued in their official capacity. The latter were the Mayor, the
Village Manager, the Director of Building and Zoning, and the entire·
Village Board of Trustees. For convenience, we will orca:sionally refer·
\o all the I?etifipners collectively as "the Village."
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and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 517 F. 2d 409 (1975). We granted
the Village's petition for certiorari, 423 U. S. 1030 (1975) ,
and now reverse.
I
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located about
26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop area. Most of the
land in Arlington Heights is zoned for detached single-family
homes, and this is in fact the prevailing land use. The
Village experienced substantial growth during the 1960's, but,
like other communities in northwest Cook County, its population of racial minority groups remained quite low. According to the 1970 census, 27 of the Village's 64,000 residents
were black.
The Clerics of St. Viator, a religious order (the Order),
own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington
Heights. Part of the site is occupied by the Viatorian high
school, and part by the Order's three-story novitiate building,
which houses dormitories and a Montessori school. Much
of the site, however, remains vacant. Since 1959, when the
Village first adopted a zoning ordinance, all the land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3, a singlefamily specifica.t ion with relatively small minimum lot size
requirements. On three sides of the Viatorian land there
are single-family homes just across a street; to the east the
Viatorian property directly adjoins the' back yards of other
single-family homes.
The Order decided in 1970 to devote some of its land to
low and moderate income housing. Investigation revealed
that the most expeditious way to build such housing was to
work through a nonprofit developer experienced in the use
of federal housing subsidies under § 236 of the National
Housing Act. 12 U. S. C. § 1715z- 1. 2
Section 236 provides for "interest reduction payments" to owners of
rental housing projects which met the Act's requirements, if the savings:
2
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MHDC is such a developer. It was organized in 1968
by several prominent Chicago citizens for the purpose of
building low and moderate income housing throughout the
Chicago area. In 1970 MHDC was in the process of building
one § 236 development near Arlington Heights and already
had provided some federally assisted housing on a smaller
scale in other parts of the Chicago area.
After some negotiation, MHDC and the Order entered into
a 99-year lease and a.n accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian
property. MHDC became the lessee immediately, but the
sales agreement was contingent upon MHDC's securing
zoning clearances from the Village and § 236 housing assistance from the Federal Government. If MHDC proved unsuccessful in securing either, both the lease and the contract
of sale would lapse. The agreement established a bargain
purchase price of $300,000, low enough to comply with federal
limitations governing land a.cquisition costs for § 236 housing.
are passed on to the tenants in accordance with a rather complex formula.
Qualifying owners effectively pay one percent interest on money borrowed
to construct, rehabilitate or purchase their properties. (Section 236 has
been amended frequently in minor respects since this litigation began.
See 12 U. S. C. § 1715z-1 (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 4, 90 Stat. 1070.)
New commitments under § 236 were suspended in 197:3 by executive
decision, and they have not been revived. Projects which formerly could
claim § 236 assistance, however, will now generally be eligible for aid
under § 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42
U. S. C. § 1437f (1970 ed., Supp. V), as amended by Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 2, 90 Stat. 1068. Under the
§ 8 program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development contracts to pay the owner of the housing units a sum which will make up
the difference between a fair market rent for the area and the amount
contributed by the low-income tenant. The eligible tenant family pays
between 15 and 25% of its gros~:; income for rent . Respondents indicated
at oral argument that, despite the demise of the § 236 program, construction of the MHDC project could proceed under § 8 if zoning clearance
is now granted.
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MHI)C engaged an architect and proceeded with the proj~
ect, to be known as Lincoln Green. ·The plans called for
20 two-story buildings with a total of 190 units, each unit
having its own private entrance from the outside. One
hundred of the units would have a single bedroom, thought
likely to attract elderly citizens. The remainder would have
two, three or four bedrooms. A large portion of the site
would remain open, with shrubs and trees to screen the homes
abutting the property to the east.
The planned development did not conform to the Village's
zoning ordinance and could not be built unless Arlington
Heights rezoned the parcel to R-5, its multiple-family housing
classification. Accordingly, MHDC filed with the Village
Plan Commission a petition for rezoning, accompanied by
supporting materials describing the development and specifying that it would be subsidized under § 236. The materials
made clear that one requirement under § 236 is an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure that a subsidized development is racially integrated. MHDC also submitted
studies demonstra.ting the need for housing of this type and
analyzing the probable impact of the development. To prepare for the hearings before the Plan Commission and to
assure compliance with the Village building code, fire regulations, and related requirements, MHDC consulted with the .
Village staff for preliminary review of the development.
The parties have stipulated that every change recommended
during such consultations was incorporated into the plans.
During the Spring of 1971 , the Plan Commission considered the proposal at a series of three public meetings, which
drew large crowds. Although many of those attending were
quite vocal and demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln Green,
a number of individuals and representatives of c0mmunity
groups spoke in support of rezoning. Some of the comments,
both from opponents and supporters, addressed what was
referred to as the "social issue"-the desirability or undesira. .
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bility of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights
low and moderate income housing, housing that would probably be racially integrated.
Many of the opponents, however, focused on the zoning
aspects of the petition, stressing two arguments. First. the
area always had been zoned single-family, and the neighboring citizens had built or purchased there in reliance on
that classification. Rezoning threatened to cause a measurable drop in property value for neighboring sites. Second,
the Village's apartment policy, adopted by the Village Board
in 1962 and amended in 1970, called for R- 5 zoning primarily
to serve as a buffer between single-family development and
land uses thought incompatible, such as commercial or
manufacturing districts. Lincoln Green did not meet this
requirement, as it adjoined no commercial or manufacturing
district.
At the close of the third meeting, the Plan Commission
adopted a motion to recommend to the Village's Board of
Trustees that it deny the request. The motion stated :
"While the need for low and moderate income housing may
exist in Arlington Heights or its environs, the Plan Commission would be derelict in recommending it at the proposed
location." Two members votsd against the motion and submitted a minority report, stressing that in their view the
change to accommodate Lincoln Green represented "good
zoning." The Village Board met on September 28, 1971,
to consider MHDC's request and the recommendation of the
Plan Commission.. After a public hearing, the Board denied
the rezoning by a 6-1 vote.
The following June MHDC and three Negro individuals
filed this lawsuit against the Village, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. 8 A second nonprofit corporation and an
The individual plaintiffs sought certification of the action as a class
action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 but the District Court declined
to certify. 373 F . Supp., at 209.
8
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individual of Mexican-American descent intervened as plain..
tiffs. The trial resulted in a judgment for petitioners. Assuming that MHDC !!!!Q__s.ta:~Hhf$. to bring the suit/ the
Dist\ict Court' held that the petitioners were not motivated
by racial discrimination or intent to discriminate against lowincome groups when they denied rezpning, but rather by a
desire "to protect property values and the integrity of the
Village's zoning plan." 373 F. Supp., at 211. The District
Court concluded also that the denial would not have a racially
discriminatory effect.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. It first approved
the District Court's finding that the defendants were motivated by a concern for the integrity of the zoning plan,
rather than by racial discrimination. Deciding whether their
refusal to rezone would have discriminatory effects was more
complex. The court observed that the refusal would have
a disproportionate impact on blacks. Based upon family in~
come, blacks constituted 40% of those Chicago area residents
who were eligible to become tenants of Lincoln Green, although they comprised a far lower percentage of total area
population. The court reasoned, however, that under our
decision in James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971), such
a disparity in racial impact alone does not call for strict
scrutiny of a municipality's decision that prevents the construction of the low-cost housing. 5
There was another level to the court's analysis of allegedly

~..l~---4•~:F'I,r-P@MI!B~ -tit !Is~

fi

IH? nat i!lca r f rgre Ute Pflr:.aM
different district
judge had heard early motions in the case. He had sustained the complaint against a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, and the judge
who finally decided the case said he found "no n
to re-examine [the
predecessor judge's] conclusions"
ic' · · '. 373 F. Supp .•
at 209.
6 Nor is there reason to subject thEe> Village's action to more stringent
review simply because it involvl'S respondents' interest in securing housing.
l-indsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972). See generally San Antonio.
[nr.('ependent School District v, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-39 (1973) .
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discriminatory results. Invoking language from Kennedy
Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d
108, 112 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1970),
the Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of rezoning must be
examined in light of its "historical context and ultimate
effect." 6 Northwest Cook County was enjoying rapid growth
in employment opportunities and population, but it continued
to exhibit a high degree of residential segregation. The court
held that Arlington Heights could not simply ignore this
problem. Indeed, it found that the Village had been "explating" the situation by allowing itself to become a nearly
all-white community. 517 F. 2d, at 414. The Village had
no other current plans for building low and moderate income
housing, and no other R-5 parcels in the Village were available to MHDC at an economically feasible price.
Against this background, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the denial of the Lincoln Green proposal had racially discriminatory effects and could be tolerated only if it served
compelling interests. Neither the buffer policy nor the desire
to protect property values met this exacting standard. The
court therefore concluded that the denial violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

II
At the outset, petitioners challenge the respondents' standing to bring the suit. It is not clear that this challenge was
pressed in the Court of Appeals, but since our jurisdiction
to decide the case is implicated, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395
U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (plurality opinion), we shall consider it.
In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), a case similar in
some respects to this one, we reviewed the constitutional
limita.tions and prudential considerations that guide a court
6

This language apparently derived from our decision in Reitman v.

Mttlkey, 387 U. S. 369, 373 (1967) (quoting from the opinion of the

'California Supreme Court in the case then under review) .

75-616-0PINION
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS v. METROPOLITAN HOUSING CORP.

8

in determining a pa.r ty's standing, and we need not repeat
that discussion here. The essence of the standihg question,
in its constitutional dimension, "is whether the plaintiff has
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers
on his behalf." !d., at 498-499, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The plaintiff must show that he himself is injured by the challenged action of the defendant.
The injury may be indirect, see United States v. SCRAP,
412 U. S. 669, 688 (1973), but the complaint must indicate
that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's
acts or omissions. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U. S. 488, 498 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
A
Here there can be little doubt that MHDC meets the
constitutional standing requirements. The challenged action
of the petitioners stands as an absolute barrier to constructing
the housing MHDC had contra.cted to place on the Viatorian
site. If MHDC secures the injunctive relief it seeks, that
barrier will be removed. An injunction would not, of course,
guarantee that Lincoln Green will be built. MHDC would
still have to secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies, 7
and carry through with construction. But all housing developments are subject to some extent to similar uncertainPetitioners suggest that the suspen~ion of the § 236 housing assi~tance
program makes it impossible for MHDC to carry out its proposed project
and' therefore deprives MHDC of standing. The District Court also expressed doubts about MHDC's position in the case in light of the suspension. 373 F. Supp., at 211. WhPthrr termination of all available
assistance programs would preclude standing is not a matter we need
to decide, in view of the current likelihood that ;;ub;:;idies may be secured
under § 8 of the Hol1sing and Community DPvelopmrnt Act of 1974 ..
See n. 2, suprq,.
7

75-616-0PINION
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS v. METROPOLITAN HOUSING CORP.

9

ties. When a project is as detailed and specific as Lincoln
Green, a court is not required to engage in undue speculation
as a predicate for finding that the plantiff has the requisite
personal stake in the controversy. MHDC has shown an
injury to itself that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U. S., at 38.
Petitioners nonethless appear to argue that MHDC lacks
standing because it has suffered no economic injury. MHDC 1
they point out, is not the owner of the property in question.
Its contract of purchase is contingent upon securing rezoning. 8
MHDC owes the owners nothing if rezoning is denied.
We cannot accept petitioners' argument. In the first place 1
it is inaccurate to say that MHDC suffers no economic injury
from a refusal to rezone, despite the contingency provisions
in its contract. MHDC has expended thousands of dollars
on the plans for Lincoln Green and on the studies submitted
to the Village in support of the petition for rezoning. Unless rezoning is granted, many of these plans and studies will
be worthless even if MHDC finds another site at an equally
attractive price.
Petitioners' argument also misconceives our standing re-·
s Petitioners contend that MHDC lacks standing to pursue its claim
here because a contract purchaser whose contract is contingent upon
rezoning cannot conte:;t a zoning decision in the Illinois courts. Underthe law of Illinois, only the owner of the property has standing to
pursue such an action. Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. City of Evanston,
23 Ill. 2d 48, 177 N. E. 2d 191 (1961); but see Solomon v. City of
Evanston, 29 Ill. App. 3d 782,331 N. E. 2d 380 (1975).
State law, however, does not govern the standing determination in
the federal courts. The constitutional and prudential conl:liderations
canvassed at length in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), respond
to concerns that are peculiarly federal in nature. Illinois may choose to
close its courts to applicants for rezoning unlesl:l they have an interest
more direct that MHDC's, but this choice does not necessarily disqualify
MHDC from seeking relief in fedf'ral courtH for an asHerted injury to its;
{(ld~r:al ri~hts.
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quirements. It has long been clear that economic injury
is not the only kind of injury that can support a plaintiff's standing. Ufl,ited States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at 686-687; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 734 (1972);
Data Procesing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 154 (1970) .
MHDC is a nonprofit corporation. Its interest in building
Lincoln Green stems not from a desire for economic gain,
but rather from an interest in making suitable low-cost housing available in areas where such housing is scarce. This is
not mere abstract concern about a problem of general interest.
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 739. The specific
project MHDC intends to buld, whether or not it will generate profits, provides that "essential dimension of specificity''
that informs judicial decisionmaking. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221
(1974).

B
Clearly MlfDC has met the constitutional requirements
and it therefore has standing to assert its own rights. Foremost among them is MHDC's right to be free of arbitrary
or irrational zoning actions. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S.
183 (1928); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1
(1974). But the heart of this litigation has never been the
claim that the Village's decision fails the generous Euclid
test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre. Instead it has been
the claim that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminates
against racial minorities in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a corporation, MHDC has no racial identity
and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged
discrimination. In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S. , at 499. But we need not decide whether the
circumstances of this case would justify departure from that
prudential limitation and permit MHDC to assert the con-
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stitutional rights of its prospective minority tenants. See
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953); cf. Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 237 (1969);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 72- 73 (1917). For we
have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated
standing to assert these rights as his own. 0
Respondent Ransom , a Negro, works at the Honeywell
factory in Arlington Heights and lives approximately 20
miles away in Evanston in a 5-room house with his mother
and his son. The complaint alleged that he seeks and would
qualify for the housing MHDC wants to build in Arlington
Heights. Ransom testified at trial that if Lincoln Green
were built he would probably move there, since it is closer
to his job.
The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing
nearer his employment has been thwarted by official action
tha.t is racially discriminatory. If a court grants the relief
he seeks, there is at least a "substantial probability," Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 504, ' that the Lincoln Green project
will materialize, affording Ransom the housing opportunity
he desires in Arlington Heights. His is not a generalized grievance. Instead, as we suggested in Warth, id., at 507, 508
n, 18, it focuses on a particular project and is not dependent
on speculation about the possible actions of third parties not
before the court. See id. , at 505; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 41-42. Unlike the individual plaintiffs in Warth, Ransom has adequately averred an
"actionable causal relationship" between Arlington Heights1
zoning practices and his asserted injury. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S., at 507. We therefore proceed to the merits.

III
Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426· U. S.
9 Because of the presence of this plaintiff, we need not consider
·whether the other individu.a l and corporate pla.in tiffs have standing tG>
·maintain the suit,
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229 (1976), made it clear that official action will not be held
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially dis ...
proportionate impact. "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious
racial discrimination.,' !d., at 242. Proof of racially discrim ...
inatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. Although some contrary indications may be drawn from some of our cases/ 0 the holding
in Davis reaffirmed a principle well established in a variety
of contexts. E. g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U. S.
189, 208 (1973) (schools); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S.
52, 56-57 (1964) (election districting); Akins v. 'l'exas, 325
U. S. 398, 403-404 (1945) (jury selection).
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a 'broad mandate made a
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that
a particular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one. 11
In fact, it is because legisla.tors and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain 'from reviewing the merits of their
decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.
But racial discrimination deserves no weight in the legislative
scales. When there ·~s ~roof, tl1~t
discriminatory purpose

a·

10 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, ~25 (1971); Wright v. Council
of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451, 461-462 (1972); cf. United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 381-386 (1968). See discussion in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242-~44 (1976) .
11 In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 276-277 (1973), in a some-

what different context, we observed :
"The search for legislative purpose is often f'lusive enough, Palme1· v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), without a rf'quirement that primacy be
ascertained. Legislation is frequently multip~rposed: the removal of'
even a 'subordinate' purpose may shift altogether the consensus of legislative judgment supporting the statute'.''

t ,,
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has been
·
in the decision, this !judicial
deference is no longer justified. 12 ,
~
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was
---:a;e
- H8et,....i&l fa~ demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action-whether it "bears
•
more heavily on one race than another," Washington v. Davis,
\..,;. a.__l\al.,.llt..,j f 426 U. S., at 242-may provide an important starting point.
'-J
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds ather'
than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United
States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268
(1939); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. 13 But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or
Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative,14 and the Court
must look to other evidence.u

1

___.J

1'
or a scholarly discussion of legislative motivation, see Brest, Palmer
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 116-118.
13 Several of our jury selection cases fall into this category.
Because
of the nature -of the jury selection task, however, we have permitted a
finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does
not approach the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion. See, e. g., T·urner·
v, Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 359 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404,.
407 (1967) .
14 This is not to say that a consistent pattern of official discrimination
is a necessary predicate to a violation of the equal protection clause. A
single invidiously discriminatory governmental act-in the exercise of the
zoning power as elsewher~would not be immunized by the absence of
such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions. See
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 378 (1975).
16 In many instances, to recognize the limited probative value of disproportionate impact is merely to acknowledge t~e "heterogeneity" of the·
nation's population. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 548 (1972) ;.
~~ als9 Washi,nqton v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 248.

_...
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The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary
BOlfrce, P~trticularly if it reveals a series of official actions
taken for invidious purposes. See Lane v. Wilson, supra;
Griffin v. Cpunty School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Davis
v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (SD Alfl..), aff'd per curiam,
33f? U. S. 933 (1949); cf. Keyes v. School District No. 1,
41;l U. S., at 207. The specific sequence of events leading
up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on
tqe decisionmaker'& purposes. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S.
36Q, 373-376 (1967); Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S.
233, 250 (1936). For example, if the property involved here
always had been zo:qed R-5 but suddenly was changed to
R-3 when the town learned of MHDC's plans to erect integrated housing,16 we would have a far different case. Departures from the normal procedural sequence also might
afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.
Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if
the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.11
16 See, e. g., Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F . 2d 222
(CA7 1961) (park board allegedly condemned plaintiffs' land for a park
upon learning that the homes plaintiffs were Precting there would be sold
under a marketing plan designed to assure integration); Kennedy Park
Homes Association, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 108 (CA2
·1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 ( 1971) (town declared moratorium
on new subdivisions and rezoned area for park land shortly after learning
of plaintiffs' plans to build low in com!' housing). To the extent that
the decision in Kennedy Park Homes rested solely on a finding of discriminatory impact, we ha.ve indicated our disagreement. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U. S., at 244-245 .
17 See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F. 2d 1037 (CA10 1970) .
The
plaintiffs in Dailey planned to build low income housing on the site of
a former :;chool that they had purcha;:;ed. The city refused to rezone
the land from PF, its public facilities classification, to R-4, high-density
residential. All the surrounding area was zoned R-4, and both the
present and the former planning director for the city testified that there
was no reason "from a zoning standpoint" why the land should not be
{:lassified R-4. Based on this and other evidence, the Court of Appeal~
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The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by
members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings,
or reports. In some instances the members might be called
to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the
official action, although such testimony frequently will be
barred by privilege. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367
(1951); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 (1974);
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2371 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) ..18
The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to
be exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining
whether racially discriminatory intent existed., With these
in mind, we now address the case before us.
IV
This caSe was tried in the District Court and reviewed in
the Court of Appeals before our decision in Washington v.
Davis, supra. The respondents proceeded on the erroneous
theory that the Village's refusal to rezone carried a racially
discriminatory effect and was, without more, unconstitutional.
But both courts below understood that at least part of their
function was to examine the purpose underlying the decision.
In making its findings on this issue, the District Court noted
that some of the opponents of Lincoln Green who spoke at
the various hearings might have been motivated by opposition to minority groups. The court held, however, that the
ruled that "the record su:;tains the [District Court's] holding of racial
motivation and of arbitrary and unreasonable action." !d., at 1040.
18 This Court has recognized, ever since Fletche1· v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87,
130-131 (1810), that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other
branches of government. The problems involved have prompted a good
deal of scholarly commentary. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 356-361 (1949); A. Bickel,
The Least Dangerow:; Branch, 208-221 (1962); Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205
'(1970); Brest, supra, n. 8.
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evidence "does not warrant the conclusion that this motivated
the defendants." 373 F. Supp., at · 211.
On appeal the Court of Appeals focused primarily on respondents' claim that the Village's buffer policy had not
been consistently applied and was being invoked with a
strictness here 'that could only demonstrate some other unaerlying motive. The court concluded 'that the · buffer policy,
though not always applied with perfect consistency, had on
several occasions formed the basis for the Board's decision
to deny other rezoning proposals. "The evidence does not
necessitate a finding that Arlington Heights administered this
policy in a discriminatory manner." 517 F. '2d, at 412. The
Court of Appe~ls therefore approved the District Court's
findings concerning the Village's purposes in denying rezoning
to MHDC.
We also have reviewed the evidence. The impact of the
Village's ·decision does arguably bear more hea.vily on racial
minorities. Minorities comprise 18"% of the Chicago area
population, and 40% of the income groups said to be eligible
for Lincoln Green. Although this disparity is not excessive,
when viewed against the background of substantial de fqcto
housing segregation in Arlington Heights, it does tend to
support further inquiry. But the evidence tending to negate
the presence of discriminatory purpose substantially outweighs the ambiguous force of the disparity. There is little
about the sequence of events leading up to the decision that
would spark suspicion. The area around the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 since 1959, the year when Arlington
Heights first adopted a zoning map. Single-family homes
surround the 80-acre site, and · the Village is undeniably committed to single-family homes as its dominant residential land
use. The rezoning request progressed according to the usual
procedures? 0 The Plan Commission even scheduled two adRespon4ents have made much of one apparent procedural departure.
The ·parties stipulated that th.e Village Planner, the staff member who~:~~
19

,'

,

.
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ditional hearings, at least in part to accommodate MHDC
and permit it to supplement its presentation with answers
to questions generated at the first hearing.
· The statements by the Plan Commission and Village Board
members, as reflected in the official minutes, focused almost
exclusively on the zoning aspects . of the MHDC petition,
and the zoning factors on which they relied are not novel
cri_teria in the Village's rezoning decisions. There is no· reason to doubt that there has been reliance by some neighboring property owners on the maintenance of single-f11-mily
zo~ing in the vicinity. The Village originally adopted its ·
buffer policy long before 1\fflDC entered the picture and has
applied the policy too consistently for us to infer discriminatory purpose from its application in this case. Finally,
MHDC called one member of the Village Board to the stand ·
at trial. Nothing in her testimony supports an inference of
inviqious purpose. 20
In sum, the evidence does not warrant overturning the
concurrent findings of both courts below. Respondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was,..fir ~88ti8B~ittl fae~·Qr in the Village's decision.
primar)'r responsibility covered zoning and planning matters, was never
ask~ ·for his written or oral opinion of the rezoning requPst .
The
trrlission does seem curious, but respondents failed to prove at trial what
role the Planner customarily played in rezoning decisions, or whPthcr his
opinion would be relevant to respondents' claims.
zo Respondents compla.in that the District Court unduly limited their
efforts t.o prove that the Village Board acted for discriminatory purposes,
since it forbade questioning Board members about their motivation at
the time they cast their votes. We perceive no abuse of discretion in
the circumstances of this case, even if such an inquiry into motivation
woulq otherwise have been proper. See n. 18, supra. Respondents were
allowect, both during the discovery phase and at trial, to question Board
members fully about materials and information available to them at the
time of decision. In light of respondents' repeated insistence that it
-was effect and not motiv11tion which would make out · 11 constitutional
·viola.t~on, the District Court's action was not improper.
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This conclusion ends the constitutional inquiry. The Court
of Appeals' further finding that the Village's decision carried
a discriminatory "ultimate effect" is without independent
legal significance. The judgment is reversed.

v
Respondents' complaint also alleged that the refusal to
rezone violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et
seq. They have urged that claim here. The Court of Appeals, however, proceediflg in a somewhat unorthodox fashion,
did not de.cide the statutory question. We remand the case
for further consideration limited to that issue.
Reversed and remanded.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court..
In 1971 respondent Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation (MHDC) applied to petitioner, the Village or
Arlington Heights, Ill., for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel
from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using
federal financial assistance, MHbC planned to build 190
clustered townhouse units for low and moderate income
tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC,
joined by other plaintiffs who are also respondents here,
brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.1 They alleged that the deni~1
was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia,
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq. Following a bench trial,
the District Court entered Judgment for the Village, 373 F.
Supp. 208 (1974), and respondents appealed. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the"ultimate effect" of the denial was racially discriminatory,
1

Respondents named as defendants both the Village and a number of

its officials, sued in their official capacity. The latter were the Mayor, the
Village Manager, the Director of Building and Zonmg, and the entire·
Village Board of Trustees. For convenience, we will occaswnally refer-·
*P. all the I?etit'ipners collectively as "thr Village ''
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and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 517 F. 2d 409 (1975). We granted
the Village's petition for certiorari, 423 U. S. 1030 (1975) ,
and now reverse.
I
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located about
26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop area. Most of the
land in Arlington Heights is zoned for detached single-family
homes, and this is in fact the prevailing land use. · The
Village experienced substantial growth during the 1960's, but,
like other communities in northwest Cook County, its population of racial minority groups remained quite low. According to the 1970 census,,_27 of the Village's 64,000 residents
were black.
The Clerics of St. Viator, a religious order (the Order),
own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington
Heights. Part of the site is occupied by the Viatorian high
school, and part by the Order's three-story novitiate building,
which houses dormitories and a Montessori school. Much
of the site, however, remains vacant. Since 1959, when the
Village first adopted a zoning ordinance, all the land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3, a singlefamily specification with relatively small minimum lot size
requirements. On three sides of the Viatorian land there
are single-family homes just across a street; to the east the
Viatorian property directly adjoins the· back yards of other
single-family homes.
The Order decided in 1970 to devote some of its land to
low and moderate income housing. Investigation revealed
that the most expeditious way to build such housing was to ·
work through a nonprofit developer experienced in the use
of federal housing subsidies under ~ 236 of the National
Housing Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1715z-1. 2
Section 236 provides for "interest reduction payments" to owners of
rental housing projects which met the Act's rectuirements, if the savings:
2

~'r

?
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MHDC is such a developer. It was organized in 1968
by several prominent Chicago citizens for the purpose of
building low and moderate income housing throughout the
Chicago a.rea. In 1970 MHDC was in the process of building
one § 236 development near Arlington Heights and already
had provided some federally assisted housing on a smaller
scale in other parts of the Chicago area.
After some negotiation, MHDC and the Order entered into
a 99-year lease and an accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian
property. MHDC became the lessee immediately, but the
sales agreement was contingent upon MHDC's securing
zoning clearances from the Village and § 236 housing assistance from the Federal Government. If MHDC proved unsuccessful in securing either, both the lease and the contract
of sale would lapse. The agreement established a bargain
purchase price of $300,000, low enough to comply with federal
limitations governing land acquisition costs for § 236 housing.
are passed on to the tenants in accordance with a rather complex formula .
Qualifying owners effectively pay onf' percent interest on money borrowed
to construct, rehabilitate or purchase their properties. (Section 236 has
been amended frequently in minor respects since this litigation began.
See 12 U. S. C. § 1715z-1 (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 4, 90 Stat. 1070.)
New commitments under § 236 were ~;uspended in 1973 by executive
decision, and they have not been revived. Projects which formerly could
claim § 236 assistance, however, will now generally be eligible for aid
under § 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42
U. S. C. § 1437f (1970 ed., Supp. V), as amended by Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 2, 90 Stat. 1068. Under the
§ 8 program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development contracts to pay the owner of the housing units a sum which will make up
the difference between a fair market rent for the area and the amount
contributed by the low-income tenant. The eligible tenant family pays
between 15 and 25% of its gross income for rent. Respondents indicated
at oral argument that, despite the demise of the § 236 program, construction of the MHDC project could proceed under § 8 if zoning cle,arance
is now granted.
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MHDC engaged an architect and proceeded with the proj~
ect, to be known as Lincoln Green. ·The plans called for
20 two-story buildings with a total of 190 units, each unit
having its own private entrance from the outside. One
hundred of the units would have a single bedroom, thought
likely to attract elderly citizens. The remainder would have
two, three or four bedrooms. A large portion of the site
would remain open, with shrubs and trees to screen the homes
abutting the property to the east.
The planned development did not conform to the Village's
zoning ordinance and could not be built unless Arlington
Heights rezoned the parcel to R-5, its multiple-family housing
classification. Accordingly, MHDC filed with the Village
Plan Commission a petition for rezoning, accompanied by
supporting materials describing the development and specifying that it would be subsidized under § 236. The materials
made clear that one requirement under § 236 is an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure that a subsidized development is racially integrated. MHDC also submitted
studies demonstrating the need for housing of this type and
analyzing the probable impact o.f the development. To prepare for the hearings before the Plan Commission and to
assure compliance with the Village building code, fire regulations, and related requirements, MHDC consulted with the
Village staff for prelimina.r y review of the development.
The parties have stipulated that every change recommended
during such consultations was incorporated into the plans.
During the Spring of 1971, the Plan Commission considered the proposal at a series of three public meetings, which
drew large crowds. Although many of those attending were
quite vocal and demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln Green,
a number of individuals and representatives of cG>mmunity
groups spoke in support of rezoning. Some of the comments,
both from opponents and supporters, addressed what was
referred to as the "social issue"- the desirability or undesira-.
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bility of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights
low and moderate income housing, housing that would probably be racially integrated.
Many of the opponents, however, focused on the zoning
aspects of the petition, stressing two arguments. First. the
area always had been zoned single-family, and the neighboring citizens had built or purchased there in reliance on
that classification. Rezoning threatened to cause a measurable drop in property value for neighboring sites. Second,
the Village's apartment policy, adopted by the Village Board
in 1962 and amended in 1970, called for R-5 zoning primarily
to serve as a buffer between single-family development and
land uses thought incompatible, such as commercial or
manufacturing districts. Lincoln Green did not meet this
requirement, as it adjoined no commercial or manufacturing
district.
At the close of the third meeting, the Plan Commission
adopted a motion to recommend to the Village's Board of
Trustees that it deny the request. The motion stated :
"While the need for low and moderate income housing may
exist in Arlington Heights or its environs, the Plan Commission would be derelict in recommending it at the proposed
location." Two members votsd against the motion and submitted a minority report, stressing that in their view the
change to accommodate Lincoln Green represented "good
zoning." The Village Board met on September 28, 1971,
to consider MHDC's request and the recommendation of the
Plan Commission.. After a public hearing, the Board denied
the rezoning by a 6-1 vote.
The following June MHDC and three Negro individuals
filed this lawsuit against the Village, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. 3 A second nonprofit corporation and an
a The individual plaintiffs sought certification of the action as a class
action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 but the District Court declined
to certify. 373 F . Supp., at 209.
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individual of Mexican-American descent intervened as plain~
tiffs. The trial resulted in a judgment for petitioners. Assuming that MHDC had standing to bring the suit,• the
District Court held that the petitioners were not motivated
by racial discrimination or intent to discriminate against low~
income groups when they denied rezoning, but rather by a
desire "to protect property values and the integrity of the
Village's zoning plan." 373 F . Supp., at 211 . The District
Court concluded also that the denial would not have a racially
discriminatory effect.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. It first approved
the District Court's finding that the defendants were motivated by a concern for the integrity of the zoning plan,
rather than by racial discrimination. Deciding whether their
refusal to rezone would have discriminatory effects was more
complex. The court observed that the refusal would have
a disproportionate impact on blacks. Based upon family income, blacks constituted 40% of those Chicago area residents
who were eligible to become tenants of Lincoln Green, although they comprised a far lower percentage of total area
population. The court reasoned, however, that under our
decision in James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971) , such
a disparity in racial impact alone does not call for strict
scrutiny of a municipality's decision that prevents the construction of the low-cost housing.5
There was another level to the court's analysis of allegedly
Fsr J@? Siil s ll'lJii.£f""o8MF'Mft- eleM..ft~
I'~, a different district
judge had heard early motions in the cru;e. He had sustained the complaint against a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, and the judge
who finally decided t he case said he found "no need to re-examine [the
predecessor judge's] conclusions" concerning justiciability. 373 F. Supp.,
at 209.
5 Nor is there reason to subjecL the Village's achon to more ;;1:ringent
review simply because it involves respondrnts' interest in securing housing.
l-indsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 73-74 (1972) . See generally San Antonia,
[n<fependent School .District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 18-39 (1973 ) .
4
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discriminatory results. Invoking language from Kennedy
Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d
108, 112 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1970),
the Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of rezoning must be
examined in light of its "historical context and ultimate
effect." 6 Northwest Cook County was enjoying rapid growth
in employment opportunities and population, but it continued
to exhibit a high degree of residential segregation. The court
held that Arlington Heights could not simply ignore this
problem. Indeed, it found that the Village had bee11 "explq~ing" the situation by allowing itself to become a nearly
all-white community. 517 F. 2d, at 414. The Village had
no other current plans for building low and moderate income
housing, and no other R-5 parcels in the Village were available to MHDC at an economically feasible price.
Against this background, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the denial of the Lincoln Green proposal had racially discriminatory effects and could be tolerated only if it served
compelling interests. Neither the buffer policy nor the desire
to protect property values met this exacting standard. The
court therefore concluded that the denial violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

II
At the outset, petitioners challenge the respondents' standing to bring the suit. It is not clear tha.t this challenge was
pressed in the Court of Appeals, but since our jurisdiction
to decide the case is implicated, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395
U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (plurality opinion), we shall consider it.
In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) , a case similar in
some respects to this one, we reviewed the constitutiona.l
limitations and prudential considerations tha.t guide a court
6 This language apparently derived from our decision in Reitman v.
Mttlkey, 387 U. S. 369, 373 (1967) (quoting from the opinion of the
I California Supreme Court in the Cl!Se then under review) .
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in determining a pa.r ty's standing, and we need not repeat
that discussion here. The essence of the standing question,
in its constitutional dimension, "is whether the plaintiff has
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers
on his behalf." !d., at 498-499, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U. S. 186, 204 (1962). The plaintiff must show that he himself is injured by the challenged action of the defendant.
The injury may be indirect, see United States v. SCRAP,
412 U. S. 669, 688 (1973), but the complaint must indicate
that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's
acts or omissions. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
.Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U. S. 488, 498 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
614, 617 (1973).
A

u.s.

Here there can be little doubt that MHDC meets the
constitutional standing requirements. The challenged actiou
of the petitioners stands as an absolute barrier to constructing
the housing MHDC had contracted to place on the Viatorian
site. If MHDC secures the injunctive relief it seeks, that
barrier will be removed. An injunction would not, of course,
guarantee that Lincoln Green will be built. MHDC would
still have to secure fi,nancing, qualify for federal subsidies/
and carry through with construction. But all housing developments are subject to some extent to similar uncertain~
7 Petitioners suggt'St that the suspension of the § 236 housing assistance
program makes it impossible for MHDC to carry out its proposed project
and therefore deprives MHDC of standing. The District Court also expressed doubts about MHDC's position in the case in light of the suspension. 373 F. Supp., at 211. Whether termination of all available
assistance programs would preclude standing is not a matter we need
to decide, in view of the current likelihood that subsidies may be roecured
under § 8 of the Hot\Sing and Community Development Act of 1974,
See n. 2, supra;.

•'
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ties. When. a project is as detailed and specific as Lincoln
Green, a court is not required to engage in undue speculation
as a predicate for finding that the plantiff has the requisite
personal stake in the controversy. MHDC has shown an
injury to itself that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U. S., at 38.
Petitioners nonethless appear to argue that MHDC lacks
standing because it has suffered no economic injury. MHDC,
they point out, is not the owner of the property in question.
Its contract of purchase is contingent upon securing rezoning. 8
MHDC owes the owners nothing if rezoning is denied.
We cannot accept petitioners' argument. In the first place 1
it is inaccurate to say that MHDC suffers no economic injury
from a refusal to rezone, despite the contingency provisions
in its contract. MHDC has expended thousands of dollars
on the plans for Lincoln Green and on the studies submitted
to the Village in support of the petition for rezoning. Unless rezoning is granted, many of these plans and studies will
be worthless even if MHDC finds another site at an equally
attractive price.
Petitioners' argument also misconceives our standing rePetitioners contend that MHDC lacks standing to pursue its claim
here because a contract purchaser whose contract is contingent upon
rezoning cannot contest. a zoning decision in the Illinois courts. Under
the law of Illinois, only the owner of the property has standmg to
pursue such an action. Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. City of Evanston,
23 Ill. 2d 48, 177 N. E. 2d 191 (1961); but see Solomon v. City of
'Evans~9 Ill. App. 3d 782,331 N. E. 2d 380 (1975) .
State law"A ~~-~ does not govern •lui iltaot+8tR~ determinatiot:[ln
l!_he federal courts. The constitutional and prudential consideratwns
canvassed at length in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975) , respond'
to concerns that are peculiarly federal in nature. Illinois may choose to
close its courts to applicants for rezoning unless they have an interest
more direct that MHDC's, but this choice does not necessarily disqualify
MHDC from seeking relief in fedPral courts for an asserted injury to its;
{tl(i~.:al ri~hts ..
8

r

--

s
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quirements. It has long been clear that economic injury'
is not the only kind of injury that can support a plaintiff's st~nding. U11ited States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at 686687; Sierr(l Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 734 (1972) ;
Data Procesirtg Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 154 (1970) .
MHDC is a nonprofit corporation. Its interest in building
Lincoln Green stems not from a desire for economic gain,
but rf\,ther from an interest in making suitable low-cost housing avail&ble in areas where such housing is scarce. This is
not mere abstrl'\-Ct concern about a problem of general interest.
See Sierra Cl'!.Lb v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 739. The specific
project MHDC intends to btid, whether or not it will generate profits, provides that "essential dimension of specificity''
that informs judicial decisionmaking. Schlesinger v. Re-.
servists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221
(1974).
B
Clearly MlJDC has met the constitutional requirements
and it therefore has standing to assert its own rights. Foremost among them is MHDC's right to be free of arbitrary
or irrational zoning actions. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U. S. 365 ( 1926) ; N ectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S.
1S3 (1928); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1
(1974). But the heart of this litigation has never been the
cl~tim that the Village's decision fails the generous Euclid
test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre. Instead it has been
the claim that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminates
against racial minorities in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a corporation, MHDC has no racial identity
and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged
discrimination. In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S., at 499. But we need not decide whether the
circumstances of this case would justify departure from that
prudential limitation anei permit MHDC to assert the con ...

•

•
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stitutional rights of its prospective minority tenants. See
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953); cf. Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 237 (1969);
Buchanan v. . Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 72-73 (1917). For we
have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated
standing to assert these rights as his own .9
Respondent Ransom, a Negro, works at the Honeywell
factory in Arlington Heights and lives approximately 20
miles away in Evanston in a 5-room house with his mother
and his son. The complaint alleged that he seeks 1:\nd would
qualify for the housing MHDC wants to build in Arlington
Heights. Ransom testified at trial that if Lincoln Green
were built he would probably move there, since it is closer
to his job.
The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing
nearer his employment has been thwarted by official action
tha.t is racially discriminatory. If a court grants the relief
he seeks, there is at least a "substantial probability," Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U. 8., at 504, that the Lincoln Green project
will materialize, affording Ransom the housing opportunity
he desires in Arlington Heights. His is not a generalized grievance. Instead, as we suggested in Warth, id., at 507, 508
n, 18, it focuses on a particular project and is not dependent
on speculation about the possible actions of third parties not
before the court. See id., at 505; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Riyhts Org., 426 U. 8., at 41-42. Unlike the individual plaintiffs in Warth, Ransom has adequa.tely averred an
"actionable causal relationship" between Arlington Heights..
zoning practices and his asserted injury. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. 8., at 507. We therefore proceed to the merits.

III
Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S.
9 Because of the presence of this plaintiff, we nef'd not consider
·whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing tCilJ
maintain the suit,

.
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229 ( 1976), made it clear that official action will not be helQ
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially dis. .
proportionate impact. "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious
racial discrimination.)) !d., at 242. Proof of racially discrim...
inatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. Although some contrary indications may be drawn from some of our cases/0 the holding
in Davis reaffirmed a principle well established in a variety
of contexts. E. g., Keyes v. School District No.1, 413 U.S.
189, 208 (1973) (schools); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S.
52, 56-57 (1964) (election districting); Akins v. Texas, 325
U. S. 398, 403-404 (1945) (jury selection).
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a 'broad mandate made a
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that
a particular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one. 11
In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain "from reviewing the merits of their
decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.
But racial discrimination~eight--in the l€gislati¥e
scales. When there ·is proof that ~scriminatory purpose
10 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971) ; Wright v . Council
of the Citv of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 , 461--462 (1972); cf. Unite1l
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-386 (1968). See di~cussion iu
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242-~44 (1976).
11 In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S 263, 276-277 (1973) , in a some-

what different context, we observed :
"The search for legislative purpose is often elusive enough, Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U. S. 217 (1971) , without a requirement that primacy be
ascertained . Legislation is frequently multipurposed: the removal of
even a 'subordinate' purpose may . hift altogether the consensus of legis-.
lative judgment supporting the statute'.''
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sttfists~~actor

has been a
in the decision, this judicial
deference is no longer justified.12
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was
a SYBB~aHiiJt1actor demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action-whether it "bears
more heavily on one race than another," Washington v. Davis,
426 U. S., at 242-may provide an important starting point.
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other
than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United
States, 238 U. S. 347 (19l5); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268
(1939); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy.13 But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or
Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative,14 and the Court
must look to other evidence.15
12

"'

F'O~"-a sgholarl¥-cliscussion of legi!!lat>ive- motiva.t.iruJ see Brest, Palmer

v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 116-118. A
13 Several of our jury selection cases fall into this category.
Because
of the nature of the jury selection task, however , we have permitted a
finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does
not approach the extremes of Yiclc Wo or Gomillion. See, e. g., Turner·
v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 359 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404,.
407 (1967) .
14 This is not to say that a consistent pattern of official ijiscrimination
is a necessary predicate to a violation of the equal protectiOn clause. A
single invidiously discriminatory governmental act-in the exercise of the
zoning power as elsewhere-would not..(be immumzea by tlie aflsence of"
such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions. See
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 378 (1975) .
u In many instances, to recognize the limited probative value of disproportionate impact is merely tp acknowledge tpe "heterogeneity" of the·
nation's population. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 548 (1972) ;.
~~ als.c:> Washinqton v. Davis, 426 U. S., a,t 248.
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The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary
BOlfrce, p~rticularly if it reveals a series of official actions
taken for invidious purposes. See Lane v. Wilson, supra,·
Griffin v. Cpunty School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Davis
v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (SD Alft.), aff'd per curiam,
33~ U.S. ~33 (1949); cf. Keyes v. Sclwol District No.1,
41~ U. S., at 207. The specific sequence of events leading
up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on
tqe decisionma~er'~ purposes. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S.
36Q, 373-~7~ (1967); Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S.
233, 250 (1936). For example, if the property involved here
always had been zoqed R-5 but suddenly was changed to
R-3 when the town learned of MHDC's plans to erect integrated housing,16 we would have a far different case. Departures from the normal procedural sequence also might
afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.
Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if
the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.n
16 See, e. g., Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F. 2d 222
(CA7 1961) (park board allegedly condemned plaintiffs' land for a park

upon learning that the homes pla.intiffs were erecting there would be sold
under a marketing plan designed to assure integration); Kennedy Park
Homes Association, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 108 (CA2
· 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1971) (town declared moratorium
on new subdivisions and rezoned area for park land shortly after Jearnh1g
of plaintiffs' plans to build low iflcome housing). To the extent that
the decision ill Kennedy Park Homes rested solely on a finding of discriminatory impact, we have indicated our disagreement. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U. S., at 244--245.
17 See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F. 2d 1037 (CAlO 1970) .
The
plaintiffs m Dailey planned to build low income housing on the site of
a former <iChool that they had purcha;;ed. The city refused to rezone
the land from PF, its public facilities classification, to R-4, high-density
residential. All the surrounding area was zoned R-4, and both the
present and the former planning director for the city testified that there
was no reason "from a zoning standpoint" why the land should not be
(:lassified R- 4. Based on thi> and other evidenet'>, the Court of Appealfi.
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The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by
members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings
or reports. In somej1ns ances the members might be called
to the stand at tria(to testify concerning the purpose of the
official action, although ,fs""uCTltestimony frequently will be
barred by privilege. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367
(1951); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 (1974);
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2371 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)..18
The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to
be exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining
whether racially discriminatory intent existed., With these
in mind, we now address the case before us.

IV
This case was tried in the District Court and reviewed in
the Court of Appeals before our decision in Washin(Jton v.
Davis, supra. The respondents proceeded on the erroneous
theory that the Village's refusal to rezone carried a racially
discriminatory effect and was, without more, unconstitutional.
But both courts below understood that at least part of their
function was to examine the purpose underlying the decision.
In making its findings on 'this issue, the District Court noted
that some of the opponents of Lincoln Green who spoke at
the various hearings might have been motivated by opposition to minority groups. The court held, however, that the
ruled that "the record sustains the [District Court's] holding of racial
motivation and of arbitrary and unreasonable action." !d., at 1040.
18 This Court has recognized, ever since Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87,
130-131 (1810), that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other
branches of governmen~"rne problems invOlved have prompted a good
deal of scholarly commentary. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 356-361 (1949); A. Bickel,
The Least Da11gerous Branch, 208--221 (1962); Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J . 1205
'(1970) ; Brest, supra, n. 8.
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evidence "does not warrant the conclusion that this motivated
the defendants." 373 F. Supp., at 211.
On appeal the Court of Appeals focused primarily on respondents' claim that the Village's buffer policy had not
been consistently applied and was being invoked with a
strictness here 't hat could only demonstrate some other underlying motive. The court concluded that the · buffer policy,
though not always applied with perfect consistency, had on
several occasions formed the basis for the Board's decision
to deny other rezoning proposals. "The evidence does not
necessitate a finding that Arlington Heights administered this
policy in a discriminatory manner." 517 F. 2d, at 412. The
Court of Appeals therefore approved the District Court's
findings concerning the Village's purposes in denying rezoning
to MHDC.
We also have reviewed the evidence. The impact of the
Village's decision does arguably bear more heavily on racial
minorities. Minorities comprise 18?'o of the Chicago area
population, and 40% of the income groups said to be eligible
for Lincoln Green. lJlthough this disparity is not excessive,
when viewed against the background of substantial de facto
housing segregation in Arlington Heights, it does tend to
support further inquiry. But the evidence tending to nega,.te
the presence of discriminatory purpose substantially outweighs the ambiguous force of the dispari~'J
ere IS Ittle
about the sequence of events leading up to the decision that
would spark suspicion. The area around the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 since 1959, the year when Arlington
Heights first adopted a zoning map. Single-family homes
surround the 80-acre site, 'and the Village is undeniably committed to single-family homes as its dominant residential land
use. The rezoning Tequest progressed according to the usual
procedures.1 0 The Plfl.n Commission even scheduled two adu Respon4ents have made much of one apparent procedural departure.
The ·parties stipulated that the Village Planner, the staff member whos~

1

r'

~

.·
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ditional hearings, at least in part to accommodate MHDC
and permit it to supplement its presentation with answers
to questions generated at the first hearing.
The statements by the Plan Commission and Village Board
members, as reflected in the official minutes, focused almost
exclusively on the zoning aspects of the MHDC petition,
and the zoning factors on which they 'relied are not novel
criteria in the Village's rezoning decisions. There is no reason to doubt that there has been reliance by some neighboring property owners on the maintenance of single-f11mily
zoning in the vicinity. The Village originally adopted its
buffer policy long before l'vJHDC entered the picture and has
applied the policy too consistently for us to infer discriminator}' purpose from its application in this case. Finally,
MHDC called one member of the Village Board to the stand
at trial. Nothing in her testimony supports an inference of
invidious purpose. 20
In sum, the evidence does not warrant overturning the
concurrent findings of both courts below. Respondents simply failed to caqy their burden of proving tha.t discriminatory purpose was a substantial factor in the Village's decision.
primary responsibility covered zoning and planning matters , was never
asked for his written or oral opiJlion of the rezoning request. The
omission does seem curious, but respondents failed to prove at trial what
role the Planner customarily played in rezoning decisions, or wh!:'ther his
opinion would be relevant to respondents' claims.
zo Respondents complain tha.t the District Court unduly limited their
efforts to prove that tl1e Village Board acted for discriminatory purposes,
since it forbade questioning Board members about their motivation at
the time they cast their votes. We perceive no abuse of discretion in
the circumstances of this case, even if such an inquiry into motivation
would otherwise have been proper. Seen. 18, supra. Respondents were
allowed, both during the discovery phase and at trial, to question Board
members fully about materials and information av!iilable to them at the
time of decision. In light of respondents' repeated insistence that it
was effect and not motiv11tion which would make out a com;titutio.nal
-vlc;~Iaqon, the District Court's action was not improper.

f. S,
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This conclusion ends the constitutional inquiry. The Court
of Appeals' further finding that the Village's decision carried
a discriJUinatory "ultimate effect" is without independent
legal significance. The judgment is reversed.

v
Respondents' complaint also alleged that the refusal to
rezone violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et
seq. .::raey .luL.ve. nrged-#wt;t laim here, The Court of Appea1s, however, proceediqg in a somewhat unorthodox fashion ,
did not de.cide the statutory question. We remand the case
for further consideration limited to that issue.
Reversed anq remanded.
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to the United States
v.
Court of Appeals for
Metropolitan Housing Development
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Corporation et al.
[December -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1971 respondent Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation (MHDC) applied to petitioner, the Village of
Arlington Heights, Ill., for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel
from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using
federal financial assistance, MHDC planned to build 190
clustered townhouse units for low and moderate income
tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC,
joined by other plaintiffs who are also respondents here,
brought suit l.n the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. 1 'They alleged that the denial
was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia,
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq. Following a bench trial,
the District Court entered judgment for the Village, 373 F.
Supp. 208 (1974), and respondents appealed. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the
"ultimate effect" of the denial was racially discriminatory,
Respondents named as defendants both the Village and a number of
its officials, sued in their official capacity. The latter were the Mayor, the
Village Manager, the Director of Building and Zoning, and the entire
Village Board of Trustees. For convenience, we will occasionally refer
to all the petitioners collectively as "the Vtllagf' "
1
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and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated the Four~
teenth Amendment. 517 F. 2d 409 (1975). We granted
the Village's petition for certiorari, 423 U. S. 1030 (1975) ,
and now reverse.
I
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located about
26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop area. Most of the
land in Arlington Heights is zoned for detached single-family
homes, and this is in fact the prevailing land use. The
Village experienced substantial growth during the 1960's, but,
like other communities in northwest Cook County, its population of racial minority groups remained quite low. According to the 1970 census, only 27 of the Village's 64,000
residents were black.
The Clerics of St. Viator, a religious order (the Order) ,
own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington
Heights. Part of the site is occupied by the Viatorian high
school, and part by the Order's three-story novitiate building,
which houses dormitories and a Montessori school. Much
of the site, however, remains vacant. Since 1959, when the
Village first adopted a zoning ordinance, all the land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3, a singlefamily specification with relatively small minimum lot size
requirements. On three sides of the Viatorian land there
are single-family homes just across a street; to the east theViatorian property directly adjoins the back yards of other
single-family homes.
The Order decided in 1970 to devote some of its land to
low and moderate income housing. Investigation revealed
that the most expeditious way to build such housing was to
work through a nonprofit developer experienced in the use
of federal housing subsidies under ~ 236 of the National'
Housing Act, 12 U S. 0 . ~ 1715z-1.?
2

Section 236 provides for " int ere~ t reductiOn payments" to owners of
J2fOJeCtR whi_ch lll.et the Act's requirements, if the $avjngs;

rent~] h~usin~

75-615-0PINION
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS v. METROPOLITAN HOUSING CORP.

3

MHDC is such a developer. It was organized in 1968
by several prominent Chicago citizens for the purpose of
building low and moderate income housing throughout the
Chicago area. In 1970 MHDC was in the process of building
one § 236 development near Arlington Heights and already
had provided some federally assisted housing on a smaller
scale in other parts of the Chicago area.
After some negotiation, MHDC and the Order entered into
a 99-yea.r lease and an accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian
property. MHDC became the lessee immediately, but the
sales agreement was contingent upon MHDC's securing
zoning clearances from the Village and § 236 housing assistance from the Federal Government. If MHDC proved unsuccessful in securing either, both the lease and the contract
of sale would lapse. The agreement established a ba.rgain
purchase price of $300,000, low enough to comply with federal
limitations governing land acquisition costs for § 236 housing.
are passed on to the tenants in accordance with a rather complex formula.
Qualifying owners effectively pay one percent interest on money borrowed
to construct, rehabilitate or purchase their properties. (Section 236 has
been amended frequently in minor respects since this litigation began.
See 12 U. S. C. § 1715z-1 (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 4, 90 Stat. 1070.)
New commitments under § 236 were suspended in 1973 by executive
decision, and they have not been revived. Projects which formerly could
claim § 236 assistance, however, will now generally be eligible for aid
under § 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42
U. S. C. § 1437f (1970 ed., Supp. V), as amended by Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 2, 90 Stat. 1068. Under the
§ 8 program, the Department of Housmg and Urban Development contracts to pay the owner of the honsmg umts a sum which will make up
the difference between a fair market rent for the area and the amount
contributed by the low-mcome tenant. The eligible tenant family pays
between 15 and 25% of its gross mcorrw for rent. Respondents indicated
at oral argument that, despite the demise of the § 236 program, construction of the MHDC project could proceed under § 8 if zoning clearance
is now .~ranted.
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MHDC engaged an architect and proceeded with the project, to be known as Lincoln Green. The plans called for
20 two-story buildings with a total of 190 units, each unit
having its own private entrance from the outside. One
hundred of the units would have a single bedroom, thought
likely to attract elderly citizens. The remainder would have
two, three or four bedrooms. A large portion of the site
would remain open, with shrubs and trees to screen the homes
abutting the property to the east.
The planned development did not conform to the Village's
zoning ordinance and could I!9t be built unless Arlington
Heights rezoned the parcel to R-5, its multiple-family housing
classification. Accordingly, MHDC filed with the Village
Plan Commission a petition for rezoning, accompanied by
supporting materials describing the development and specifying that it would be subsidized under § 236. The materials
made clear that one requirement under § 236 is an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure that a subsidized development is racially integrated. MHDC also submitted
studies demonstrating the need for housing of this type and
analyzing the probable impact of the development. To prepare for the bearings before the Plan Commission and to
assure compliance with the Village building code, fire regulations, and related requirements, MHDC consulted with the
Village staff for preliminary review of the development.
The parties have stipulated that every change recommended
during such consultations was incorporated into the plans.
During the Spring of 1971, the Plan Commission considered the proposal at a series of three public meetings, which
drew large crowds. Although many of those attending were
quite vocal and demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln Green,
a number of individuals and representatives of community
groups spoke in support of rezoning. Some of the comments,
both from opponents and supporters, addressed what was
:ref~rreg_ to as the "soQial i~ue "-the d.e&ir.v.bility or undesira-

75-616-0PINION
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS v. METROPOLITAN HOUSING CORP.

5

bility of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights
low and moderate income housing, housing that would probably be racially integrated.
Many of the opponents, however, focused on the zoning
aspects of the petition, stressing two arguments. First, the
area always had been zoned single-family, and the neighboring citizens had built or purchased there in reliance on
that classification. Rezoning threatened to cause a measurable drop in property value for neighboring sites. Second)
the Village's apa.r tment policy, adopted by the Villa.ge Board
in 1962 and amended in 1970, called for R-5 zoning primarily
to serve as a buffer between single-family development and
land uses thought incompatible, such as commercial or
manufacturing districts. Lincoln Green did not meet this
requirement, as it adjoined no commercial or manufacturing
district.
At the close of' the third meeting, the Plan Commission
adopted a motion to recommend to the Village's Board of
Trustees that it deny the request. The motion stated :
"While the need for low and moderate income housing may
exist in Arlington Heights or its environs, the Plan Cornmission would be derelict in recommending it at the proposed
location." Two members voted against the motion and submitted a minority report, stressing that in their view the
change to accommodate Lincoln Green represented "good
zomng.'' The Village Board met on September 28, 1971,
to consider MHDC's request and the recommendation of the
Plan Commission.. After a public hearing, the Board denied
the rezoning by a 6-1 vote.
The following June MHDC and three Negro individuals
filed this lawsmt against the Village, seeking declaratory and
injunctive re1ief. 8 A second nonprofit corporation and an
The individual plaintiffs sought certification of the action as a class
action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ Proc. 23 but the District Court declined
to cerit1fy 373 F . Supp ., at 209.
8
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individual of Mexican-American descent intervened as plain~
tiffs. The trial resulted in a judgment for petitioners. Assuming that MHDC had standing to bring the suit/ the
District Court held that the petitioners were not motivated
by racial discrimination or intent to discriminate against low
income groups when they denied rezoning, but rather by a
desire "to protect property values and the integrity of the
Village's zoning plan." 373 F. Supp., at 211. The District
Court concluc:J"ed also that the denial would not have a racially
discriminatory effect.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. It first approved
the District eourt's finding that the defendants were motivated by a concern for the integrity of the zoning plan,
rather than by racial discrimination. Deciding whether their·
refusal· to rezone would have discriminatory effects was more
complex. The court observed that the refusal would have
a disproportionate impact on blacks. Based upon family in-.
come, blacks constituted 40% of those Chicago area residents
who were eligible to become tenants of Lincoln Green, although they comprised a far lower percentage of total area
population. The court reasoned, however, that under our
decision in James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971), such
a disparity ih racial impact alone does not call for strict
scrutiny of a municipality's decision that prevents the construction of the low-cost housing. 5
There was another level' to the court's analysis of a.llegedly
-t A different district judge had heard early motions in the case.
H<>
hnd sustained the complaint agamst a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing, and the judge who finally dec1ded thr case ~aid he found "no,
need to re-examine [the prede ees.~or judge'HI concluswns" m this respect.
373 F . Supp., at 209.
6 Nor is there reason to subject the Village's a.ction to more stringent
review simply because it involves respondents ' interest in securing housing.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 73-74 (1972) . See generally San Antonio,
~nd_eJ!endent Srhool Dtstrict v. Rodripuez, 41l U S 1; 18-39 (1973),._
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discriminatory results. Invoking language from Kennedy
Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d
108, 112 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1970),
the Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of rezoning must be
examined in light of its "historical context and ultimate
effect." 6 Northwest Cook County was enjoying rapid growth
in employment opportQnities and population, but it continued
to exhibit a high degree of residential segregation. The court
held that Arlington Heights could not simply ignore this
problem. Indeed, it found that the Village had been "exploiting" the situation by allowing itself to become a nearly
all-white community. 517 F. 2d, at 414. The Vill11ge had
no other current plans for building low and moderate income
housing, and no other R-5 parcels in the Village were available to MHDC at an economically feasible price.
Against this background, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the denial of the Lincoln Green proposal had racially discriminatory effects and could be tolerated only if it served
compelling interests. Neither the buffer policy nor the desire
to protect property values met this exacting standard. The
court therefore concluded that the denial violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

II
At the outset, petitioners challenge the respondents' standing to bring the suit. It is not clear that this challenge was
pressed in tbe Court of Appeals, but since our jurisdiction
to decide the case is implicated, Jenkins v. McK(3ithen, 395
U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (plura1ity opinion), w~ shall consider it.
In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), a case similar in
some respects to this one, we reviewed the constitutional
limitations and prudentiAl consideration~ that guide a coQrt
6 This language apparently derived from our decision jn Reitman v.
Mtdkey, 387 U. S. 369, 373 (1967) (quoting from the opinion of thB

California Supreme Court in the case then under .review).
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in determining a pa.r ty's standing, and we need not repeat
that discussion here. The essence of the standing question,
in its constitutional dimension, "is whether the plaintiff has
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers
on his behalf." Id., at 498--499, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The plaintiff must show that he himself is injured by the challenged action of the defendant.
The injury may be indirect, see United States v. SCRAP,
412 U. S. 669, 688 (1973), but the complaint must indicate
that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's
acts or omissions. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U. S. 488, 498 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
u. s. 614, 617 (1973) .
A
Here there can be little doubt that MHDC meets the
constitutional standing requirements. The challenged action
of the petitioners stands as an absolute barrier to constructing
the housing MHDC had contracted to place on the Viatorian
site. If MHDC secures the injunctive relief it seeks, that
barrier will be removed. An injunction would not, of course,
guarantee that Lincoln Green will be built. MHDC would
still have to secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies/
and carry through with construction. But all housing developments are subject to some extent to similar uncertain7 Petitioner;; suggest that the suspension of the § 236 housing assistance
program makes it impossible for MHDC to carry out its proposed project
and therefore depnves MHDC of standing. The District Court also expressed doubts about MHDC's position m tlw case in light of the sus-.
pension. 373 F . Supp., at 211. Whether termination of all available·
assistance programs would ·preclude standing is not a matter we need
to decide, in view of the current likelihood that subsidies may be secured
under § 8 of the Housing: and. Communit ' Development Act of 1974,
~~~ n. 2, suprtJ<.
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ties. When. a project is as detailed and specific as Lincoln
Green, a court is not required to engage in undue speculation
as a predicate for finding that the plantiff has the requisite
personal stake in the controversy. MHDC has shown an
injury to itself that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U. S., at 38.
Petitioners nonethless appear to argue that MHDC lacks
standing because it has suffered no economic injury .. MHDC,
they point out, is not the owner of the property in question.
Its contract of purchase is contingent upon securing rezoning. 8
MHDC owes the owners nothing if rezoning is denied.
We cannot accept petitioners' argument. In the first place,
it is inaccurate to say that MHDC suffers no economic injury
from a refusal to rezone, despite the contingency provisions
in its contract. MHDC has expended thousands of dollars
on the plans for Lincoln Green and on the studies submitted
to the Village in support of the petition for rezoning. Unless rezoning is granted, many of these plans and studies will
be worthless even if MHDC finds another site at an equally
attractive price.
Petitioners' argument also misconceives our standing re8 Petitioners contend that MHDC lacks standing to pursue its claim
here because a .contract purchaser whose contract is contingent upon
rezoning cannot contest a zoning decision in the Illinois courts. Under
the law of Illinois, only the owner of the property has standing to
pursue such an action. Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. City of Evanston,
23 Ill. 2d 48, 177 N. E. 2d 191 (1961); but see Solomon v. City of
Evanston, 29 Ill. App. 3d 782,331 N. E. 2d 380 (1975) .
State law of standing, however, does not govern such determinations in }
the federal courts. The constitutional and prudential considerations
canvassed· at length in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), respond
to concerns that are peculiarly federal in nature. Illinois may choose to
close its courts to applicants for rezoning unless they have an interest
more direct that MHDC's, but this choice does not necessarily disqualify
MHDC from seeking relief in federal courts for an a.~serted injury to its
federal rights.
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quirements. It has long been clear that economic injury
is not the only kind of injury that can support a plaintiff's standing. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at 686'687; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 734 (1972);
Data Procesing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 154 (1970).
MHDC is a nonprofit corporation. Its interest in building
Lincoln Green stems not from a desire for economic gain,
but rather from an interest in making suitable low-cost housing available in areas where such housing is sca.rce. This is
not mere abstract concern about a problem of general interest..
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 739. The specific
project MHDC intends to b.uild, whether or not it will gen-.
erate profits, pvovides that "essential dimension of specificity"
that informs judicial decisionmaking. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221
'(1974).

B
Clearly MHDC has met the constitutional requirements
and it therefore has stanqing to a.ssert its own rights. Foremost among them is MHDC's right to be free of arbitrary
or irrational zoning actions. See 'Euclid v. Ambler Realty·
Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. Cambridge, '277 U. S.
183 (1928); Villal)e of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1
(1974). But the heart of this litigation has never been the
claim that the Village's decision fails the generous 'Euclid
test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre . Instead it has been
the claim that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminates
against racial minorities in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a corporation, MHDC ha.s no racial identity
and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged
discrimination . In the ordinary case, a party is denied stand·ing to assert the rights of third persons. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S., at 499. But we need not decide whether the
circumstances of this case would justify departure from that
prudential limitation and J?etmit MHDC to assert the CQn...
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stitutional rights of its prospective minority tenants. See
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953); cf. Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 237 (1969);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 72-73 (1917). For we
have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated
standing to assert these rights as his own. 0
Respondent Ransom, a Negro, works at the Honeywell
factory in Arlington Heights and lives approximately 20
miles away in Evanston in a 5-room house with his mother
and his son. The complaint alleged that he seeks and would
qualify for the housing MHDC wants to build in Arlington
Heights. Ransom testified at trial that if Lincoln Green
were built he would probably move there, since it is closer
to his job.
The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing
nearer his employment has been thwarted by official action
that is racially discriminatory. If a court grants the relief
he seeks, there is at least a "substantial probability," Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 504, ' that the Lincoln Green project
will materialize, affording Ransom the housing opportunity
he desires in Arlington Heights. His is not a genera.lized grievance. Instead, as we suggested in Warth, id., at 507, 508
n. 18, it focuses on a particular project and is not dependent
on speculation about the pos.Sible actions of third parties not
before the court. See id., at 505; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 41-42. Unlike the individual plaintiffs in Warth, Ransom has adequately averred an
"actionable causal relationship" between Arlington Heights'
zoning practices and his asserted injury. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S., at 507. We therefore proceed to the merits.
UI
Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S.
9 Because of the presence of tins plaintiff, we need not consider
whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to .
maintain the suit.
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229 ( 1976), made it clear that official action will not be held
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially dis-'
proportionate impact. "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious
racial discrimination." I d., at 242. Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. Although some contrary indications may be drawn from some of our cases,"{) the holding
in Davis reaffirmed a. principle well established in a variety
of contexts. E. g., Keyes v. School District No.1, 413 U.S.
189, 208 (1973) (schools); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S.
52, 56-57 (1964) (election districting); Akins v. Texas, 325
U. S. 398, 403-404 (1945) (jury selection).
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that
a particular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one.11
In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with bala.ncing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their
decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.
But racial discrimination is not just another competing con- \
sideration. When there is a proof that a discriminatory purPalmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971) ; Wrignt v. Council
of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451, 461-462 (1972); cf. United
States v. O'B rien, 391 U. S. 367, 381-386 (1968) . See discussion in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242-~44 (1976) .
11 In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 276- 277 (1973), in a somewhat different context, we observed :
"The search for legislath·e purpose is often elusive enough, Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U. S. 217 (1971) , without a requirement t hat primacy be
ascertained. Legislation is frequently multipurposed : the removal of
even a 'subordinate' purpose may shift altogether the consensus of. legia·
lativ~ j\\dgment supporting t he statute."
10
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pose has been a motivating factor in the decision , this judicial \
deference is no longer justified.1 2
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was
a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such \
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action-whether it "bears
more heavily on one race than another," Washington v. Davis,
426 U. S., at 242-may provide an important starting point.
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other
than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the · governing legislation appears neutral on its face.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United
States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268
(1939); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. 18 But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or
Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative/ 4 and the Court
must look to other evidence.15
1

12 For a scholarly discussion of legislative motivation, see Brest, Palmer
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 116-118.
18 Several of our jury selection cases fall into this category.
Because
of the nature of the jury selection task, however, we have permitted a
finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does
not approach the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion. See, e. g., Turne1·
v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 359 (1970) ; Sims v. Geo1'gia, 389 U. S. 404,
407 (1967) .
14 This is not to say that a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination is a necessary predicate to a violation of the equal protection
clause. A single invidious!~· discriminatory governmental act~in the
exercise of the zoning power as elsewhere--would not necessarily be
immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other
comparable decisions. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S.
358, 378 (1975) .
15 In many instances, to recognize the limited probative value of disproportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the "heterogeneity" of the
nation's population. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 548 (1972) ;
.see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 248.
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The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary
source, pa-rticularly if it reveals a series of official actions
taken for invidious purposes. See Lane v. Wilson, supra,·
Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Davis
v. Schnf3ll, 81 F. Supp. 872 (SD Ala.), aff'd per curiam,
336 U. S. 933 (1949); cf. Keyes v. School District No. 1,
413 U. S., ~tt 207. The specific sequence of events leading
up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on
the decisionmaker's purposes. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S.
369, 373-376 (1967); Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S.
233, 250 ( 1936). For example, if the property involved here
always had been zoned R-5 but suddenly was changed to
R~3 when the town learned of MHDC's plans to erect integrated housing/ 6 we would have a far different case. Departures from the normal procedural sequence ~tlso might
afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.
Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if
the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached. 1 7
16 See, e. g., Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F. 2d 222
(CA7 1961) (park board allegedly condemned plaintiffs' land for a park
upon learning that t.he homes plaintiffs were erecting there would be sold
under a marketing plan designed to assure integration); Kennedy Park
Homes Association, Inc . v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 108 (CA2
1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1971) (town declared moratorium
on new subdivisiqns and rezoned area for park land shortly after learning
·of plaintiffs' plans to build low income housing). To the extent that
the decision in Kennedy Park Homes rested solely on a finding of discriminatory impact, we have indicated our disagreement. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U. S., at 244-24ti.
17
See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F. 2d 1037 (CA10 1970). The
plaintiffs in Dailey planned to build low income housing on the site of
a former school that they had purcha~ed . The city refused to rezone
the land from PF, its public facilities classification, to R-4, high-density
residential. All the surrounding area was zoned R-4, and both the
present and the former planning director for the city testified that there
was no reason "from a zoning standpoint" why the land should not be
<Cl~~ified R-4.
Based on this and other evidence, the Court of Appeals
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The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by
members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings,
or reports. In some extraordina,ry instances the members
might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning
the purpose of the official action, although even then such
testimony frequently will be barred by privilege. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 ( 1974); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2371
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 18
The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to
be exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining
whether racially discriminatory intent existed.. With these
in mind, we now address the case before us.
IV
This case was tried in the District Court and reviewed in
the Court of Appeals before our decision in Washington v.
Davis, supra. The respondents proceeded on the erroneous
theory that the Village's refusal to rezone carried a racially
discriminatory effect and was, without more, unconstitutional.
But both courts below understood that at least part of their
function was to examine the purpose underlying the decision.
In making its findings on this issue, the District Court noted
ruled that "the record sustains the [District Court's] holding of racial
motivation and of arbitrary and unreasonable action." !d., at 1040.
18 This Court, has recognized, ever since Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87,
130-131 (1810), that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other
branches of government. Placing a deci::;ionmaker on the stand is there.-~
fore "usually to be avoided .'' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U. S. 402, 420 ( 1971). The problrms involved havr prompted a good
deal of scholarly commentary. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws , 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 , 356-361 (1949); A. Bickel,
The Least Dangerous Branch, 208--221 (1962); Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205
(·3.970) ; Brest, supra, n. 8.
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that some of the opponents of Lincoln Green who spoke at
the various hearings might have been motivated by opposition to minority groups. The court helci, however, that the
evidence i'does not warrant the conclusion that this motivated
the defendants." 373 F. Supp., at 211.
,
On appeal the Court of Appeals focused primarily on respondents' claim that the Village's buffer policy had not
been consistently applied and was being invoked with a
strictness here that could only demonstrate some other underlying motive. The court concluded that the buffer policy,
though not always applied with perfect consistency, had on
several occasions formed the basis for the Board's decision
to deny other rezoning proposals. "The evidence does not
necessitate a finding that Arlington Heights administered this
policy in a discriminatory manner." 517 F. 2d, at 412. The
Court of Appeals therefore approved the District Court's
findings concerning the Village's purposes in denying rezoning
to MHDC.
We also have reviewed the evidence. The impact of the
Village's decision does arguably bear more heavily on racial
minorities. Minorities comprise 18% of the Chicago area
population, and 40o/o of the income groups said to be eligible
_ IJ _-r-·
1
for Lincoln Green. B~t there is little about the sequence / ~
of events leading up to the decision that would spark
suspiCion. The area .around the Viatorian property has
been zoned R-3 since 1959, the year when Arlington Heights
first adopted a zoning map. Single-family homes surround
the 80-~tcre site, and the Village is undeniably committed
to single-family homes as its dominant residential land
use. The rezoning request progressed according to the usual
procedures. 19 The Plan Commission even scheduled two ad19 Respondents have made much of one apparent procedural departure.
The parties stipulated that the Vilhge Planner, the staff member whose
primary responsibility· covered zoning smd planning matters, was never
asked for his written or oral opinion of the rezoning request. The
omi.ssion d.oes seem rurious, but respondents failed to prove at trial what
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ditional hearings, at least in part to accommodate MHDC
and permit it to supplement its presentation with answers
to questions generated at the first hearing.
The statements by the Plan Commission and Village Board
members, as reflected in the official minutes, focused almost
exclusively o·n the zoning aspects of the MHDC Petition,
and the zoning factors on which they relied are not novel
criteria in the Village's rezoning decisions. There is no reason to doubt that there has been relian,ce by some neighboring property owners on the maintenance of single-family
zoning in the vicinity. The Village originally adopted its
buffer policy long before MHDC entered the picture and has
applied the policy too consistently for us 'to infer discriminatory purpose from its application in this case. Finally,
MHDC called one member of the Village Board to the stand
at trial. · 'Nothing in her testimony supports an inference of
invidious purpose. 20
In sum, the evidence does not warrant overturning the
concurrent findings of both courts below. Respondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's decision. 21
'
role the Planner customarily played in rezoning decisions, or whether his
opinion would be relevant to respondent-s' claims.
zo Respondents complain tbat tbe District Court unduly limited their
efforts to prove that tbe Village Board acted for discriminatory purposes,
since it forbade questioning Board menibers about their motivation at
the time they cast tbeir votes. We perceive no abuse of discretion in
the circumst~tnces of this oase, even if such an inqui1y into motivation
would otherwise h~tve been proper. Seen. 18, supra. Respondents were
allowed, both during the discovery phase and at trial, to question Board
members fully about materials and information available to them at the
tim~ of decision.
In light of respondents' repeated insistence that it
was effect and not motiv~ttion which would make out a constitutional
violation, the District Court's action was not improper.
21 Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a
radally discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidartion of the ch.11llenged decision . Such proof would , howtwer, have

1
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This conclusion ends the constitutional inquiry. The Court
of Appeals' further finding that the Village's decision carried
a discriminatory "ultimate effect" is without independent
constitutional significance.

v

Respondents' complaint also alleged that the refusal to
rezone violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U. S. C. § 3601
et seq. They continue to urge here that a zoning decision
made by a public body may', and that petitioners' action
here did, violate § 3604 or § 3617. The Court of Appeals,
however, proceeding in a somewhat unorthodox fashion, did
not decide the statutory question. We remand the case for
further consideration of respondents' statutory claims.
Rever[Jed and remanded.

MR.

JusTICE STEVENS

took no part in the consideration

or decision of this case.

shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision
would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered. If this were established, the complaining party in a case of this
kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper
consideration of a discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances, there
would be no justification for judicial interference with the challenged!
decision. But in this . case respondents failed to make the required
tJ!reshold showing. See Mt . Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Education.
y, /)oyle, No. .75-1278, post, p. - ..
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1971 respondent Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation (MHDC) applied to petitioner, the Village of
Arlington Heights, Ill., for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel
from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using
federal financial assistance, MHDC planned to build 190
clustered townhouse units for low and moderate income
tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC,
joined by other plaintiffs who are also respondents here,
brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. 1 They alleged that the denial
was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia,
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of
1968. 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq. Following a bench trial,
the District Court entered judgment for the Village, 373 F.
Supp. 208 (1974), and respondents appealed. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding tha.t the
"ultimate effect" of the denial was racially discriminatory,
1 Respondents named as defrndants both the Village and a number of
its officials, sued in their official capacity. The latter were thr Mayor, the
Village Manager, the Director of Building and Zoning, and the entire
Village Board of Trustees. For convenience, we will occasionally refer
to all the petitioners collectively as "the Village."
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and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. '517 F. 2d 409 (1975). We granted
the Village's petition for certiorari, 423 U. S. 1030 (1975),
and now reverse.
I
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located about
26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop area. Most of the
land in Arlington Heights is zoned for detached single-family
homes, and this is in fact the prevailing land use. The
Village experienced substantial growth during the 1960's, but,
like other communities in northwest Cook County, its population of racial minority groups remained quite low. Only
27 o.f the Village's 64,000 residents were black, according
to the 1970 census.
The Clerics of St. Viator, a religious ol'der (the Order),
own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington
Heights. Part of the site is occupied by the Viatorian high
school, and part by the Order's three-story nov1tiate building,
which houses dormitories and a Montessori s·chool. Much
of the site, however, remains vacant. Since 1959, when the
Village first adopted a zoning ordinance, all the land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3, a singlefamily specification with relatively small minimum lot size
requirements. On three sides of the Viatorian land there
are single-family homes just across a street; to the east the
Viatorian property directly adjoins the back yards of other
single-family homes.
The Order decided in 1970 to devote some of its land to
low and moderate income housing Investigation revealed
that the most expeditious way to build such housing was to
work through a nonprofit developer experienced in the use
of federal housing subsidies under § 236 of the National
Housing Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1715z-1. 2
Section 236 provides for "interest reduction payments" to owners of
rental housing projects which met the Act's requirements, if the savings
2

,,
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MHDC is such a developer. It was organized in 1968
by several prominent Chicago citizens for the purpose of
building low and moderate income housing throughout the
Chicago area. In 1970 MHDC was in the process of building
one § 236 development near Arlington Heights and already
had provided some federally assisted housing on a smaller
scale in other parts of the Chicago area.
After some negotiation, MHDC and the Order entered into
a 99-year lease and an accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian
property. MHDC became the lessee immediately, but the
sttles agreement was contingent upon MHDC's securing
zoning clearances from the Village and § 236 housing assistance from the Federal Government. If MHDC proved unsuccessful in securing either, both the lease and the contract
of sale would lapse. The agreement established a bargain
purchase price of $300,000, low enough to comply with federal
limitations governing land acquisition costs for § 236 housing.
are passed on to the tenants in accordance with a rather complex formula.
Qualifying owners effectively pay one percent interest on money borrowed
to construct, rehabi litate or purchase their properties. (Section 236 has
been amended frequently in minor respects since this litigation began.
See 12 U.S. C.§ 1715z-1 (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94--375, § 4, 90 Stat. 1070.)
New commitments under § 236 were suspended in 1973 by executive
decision, and they have not been revived. Projects which formerly could
claim § 236 assistance, however, will now generally be eligible for aid
under § 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42
U. S. C. § 1437f (1970 ed., Supp. V), as amended by Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 2, 90 Stat. 1068. Under the
§ 8 program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development contracts to pay the owner of the housing units a sum which will make up
the difference between a fair market rent for the area and the amount
contributed by the low-income tenant. The eligible tenant family pays
between 15 and 25% of its gross income for rent. Respondents indicated
at oral argument that, despite the demise of the § 236 program, construction of the MHDC project could proceed under § 8 if zoning clearance
is now granted.
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MHDC engaged an architect and proceeded with the project, to be known as Lincoln Green. The plans called for
20 two-story buildings with a total of 190 units, each unit
having its own private entrance from the outside. One
hundred of the units would have a single bedroom, thought
likely to attract elderly citizens. The remainder would have
two, three or four bedrooms. A large portion of the site
would remain open, with shrubs and trees to screen the homes
abutting the property to the east.
The planned development did not conform to the Village's
zoning ordinance and could not be built unless Arlington
Heights rezoned the parcel to R-5, its multiple-family housing
classification. Accordingly, MHDC filed with the Village
Plan Commission a petition for rezoning, accompanied by
supporting materials describing the development and specifying that it would be subsidized under § 236. The materials
made clear that one requirement under § 236 is an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure that a subsidized development is racially integrated. MHDC also submitted
studies demonstrating the need for housing of this type and
analyzing the probable impact of the development. To prepare for the hearings before the Plan Commission and to
assure compliance with the Village building code, fire regulations, and related requirements, MHDC consulted with the
vmage staff for preliminary review of the development.
The parties have stipulated that every change recommended
during such consultations was incorporated into the plans.
During the Spring of 1971, the Plan Commission considered the proposal at a series of three public meetings, which
drew large crowds. Although many of those attending were
quite vocal and demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln Green,
a number of individuals and representatives of community
groups spoke in support of rezoning. Some of the comments,
both from opponents and supporters, addressed what was
referred to as the "social issue"-the desirability or undesira-

..
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bility of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights
low and moderate income housing, housing that would probably be racially integrated.
Many of the opponents focused on the zoning aspects of
the petition, stressing two arguments. First, the area. always
had been zoned single family, and the neighboring citizens
had built or purchased there in reliance on that classification.
Rezoning threatened to cause a measurable drop in property
value for neighboring sites. Second, the Village's apartment
policy, adopted by the Village Board in 1962 and amended
in 1970, called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer
between single family development and land uses thought
incompatible, such as commercial or manufacturing districts.
Lincoln Green did not meet this requirement, as it adjoined
no commercial or manufacturing district.
At the close of the third meeting, the Plan Commission
adopted a motion to recommend to the Village's Board of
Trustees that it deny the request. The motion stated:
"While the need for low and moderate income housing may
exist in Arlington Heights or its environs, the Plan Commission would be derelict in recommending it at the proposed
location. Two members voted against the motion and submitted a minority report, stressing that in their view the
change to accommodate Lincoln Green represented "good
zoning." The Village Board met on September 28, 1971,
to consider MHDC's request and the recommendation of the
Plan Commission., After a public hearing, the Board denied
the rezoning by a 6-1 vote.
The following June MHDC and three Negro individuals
filed this lawsuit against the Village, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relie£. 3 A second nonprofit corporation and an
individual of Mexican-American descent intervened as plain3 The individual plaintiffs sought certification of the action as a class
action pur uant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 but the District Court declined
to certify. 373 F. Supp., at 209.
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tiffs. The trial resulted in a judgment for petitioners. Assuming the MHDC had standing to bring the suit, 1 the
District Court held that the petitioners were not motivated
by racial discrimination of intent to discriminate against lowincome groups when they denied rezoning, but rather by a
desire "to protect property values and the integrity of the
Village's zoning plan." 373 F. Supp., at 211. The District
Court concluded also that the denial would not have a racially
aiscriminatory effect.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. It first approved
the District Court's finding that the defendants were motivated by a concern for the integrity of the zoning plan,
rather than by racial discrimination. Deciding whether the
refusal would have discriminatory effects was come complex.
-The court observed that the denial would have a disproportionate impacts on blacks. Based upon family income, blacks
made up 40% of Lincoln Green's eligible prospective tenants
·in the Chicago area, although they comprised a far lower percentage of total population. The court reasoned, however,
that under our decision in James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137
( 1971) , such a disparity in racial impact alone does not call
for strict scrutiny of a municipality's decision that prevents
the construction of low-cost housing. 5
There was another level to the court's analysis of allegedly
discriminatory results. Invoking language from Kennedy
Park Hames Association v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d
4 For reasons that are not clear from the record, a different district
judge had heard early motions in the case. He had sustained i he complaint against a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, and the judge
who finally decided the caRe said he found "no need io re-examine [the
predecessor judge's] conclusions" concerning justiciability. 373 F. Supp.,
at 209.
5 Nor is there reason to subject the Village's action to more stringent
review simply because it involves respondents' interest in securing housing.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,73-74 (1972). Sre generally San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-39 (1973) .

..
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108, 112 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1970),
the court ruled that the denial of rezoning must be examined
in light of its "historical context and ultimate effect." 6 Northwest Cook County was enjoying rapid growth in employment
opportunities and population, but it continued to exhibit a
high degree of residential segregation. The court held that
Arlington Heights could not simply ignore this problem. Indeed, it found that the Village had been "exploiting" the situation by allowing itself to become a nearly all-white community. 517 F. 2d, at 414. The Village had no other current
plans for building low and moderate income housing, and
no other R-5 parcels in the Village were available to MHDC
at an economically feasible price.
Against this background, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the denial of the Lincoln Green proposal had racially discriminatory effects and could be tolerated only if it served
compelling interests. Neither the buffer policy nor the desire
to protect property values met this exacting standard. The
court therefore concluded that the denial violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

II
At the outset, petitioners challenge the respondents' standing to bring th<' suit. It is not clear that this challenge was
pressed in the Court of Appeals, but, since our jurisdiction
to decide the case is implicated, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395
U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (plurality opinion), we shall consider it.
In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 ( 1975) , a case similar in
some respects to this one, we reviewed the constitutional
limitations and prudential considerations that guide a court
in determining a party's standing, and we need not repeat
that discussion here. The essence of the standing question,
6 This language apparently derived from our decision in R eitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 373 (1967) (quoting from the opinion of the
California Supreme Court in the case then under review).
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in its constitutional dimension, "is whether the plaintiff has
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers
on his behalf." !d., at 498- 499, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U. S. 186, 204 (1962). The plaintiff must show that he himself is injured by the challenged action of the defendant.
The injury may be indirect, see United States v. SCRAP,
4:12 U.S. 669, 688 (1973), but the complaint -must indicate
that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's
acts or omissions. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky WelfaT'e
Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41- 4'2 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U. S. 488, 498 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
614, 617 (1973).

u.s.

A
Here there can be little doubt that MHDC meets the
constitutional standiiig requirements. The challenged action
of the petitioners stands as an absolute barrier to constructing
the housing MHDC had contracted to place on the Viatorian
site. If MHDC secures the injunctive relief it seeks, that
barrier will be removed. An injunction would not, of course,
guarantee that Lincoln Green will be built. MHDC would
still have to secure fina ncing, qualify for federal subsidies, 7
and h ave the construction work completed. But all housing
developments are subJect to some extent to these uncertainties. When a project is as detailed and specific as Lincoln
Green, a court. is not l:'equired to engage in undue speculation
7 Petitioners suggest that the suspension of the § 236 housing assistance
program makes it impossible for MHDC to carry out its proposed proj ect
' and therefore deprives MHDC of standing. The District Court also ex'pressed doubts about MI-IDC's position in t he case in light of t he suspension. 373 F. Supp ., at 211. Whether termination of all available
assistance programs would preclude standing is not a matter we need
t o decide, in view of t he current likelihood that subsidies mLty be oecurcd
under § 8 of t he Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.
Seen. 2, supra.

;,.•
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as a predicate for finding that the plantiff has the requisite
personal stake in the controversy. MHDC has shown an
injury to itself that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U. S., at 38.
Petitioners nonethlcss appear to argue that MHDC lacks
sta.nding because it has suffered no economic injury. MHDC,
they point out, is not the owner of the property in question.
Its contract of purchase is contingent upon securing rezoning. 8
MHDC owes the owners nothing if rezoning is denied .
We cannot accept petitioners' argument. In the first place,
it is inaccurate to say that MHDC suffers no economic injury
from a refusal to rezone, despite the contingency provisions
in its contract. MHDC has expended thousands of dollars
on the plans for Lincoln Green and on the studies submitted
to the Village in support of the petition for rezoning. Unless rezoning is granted, most of these plans and studies will
be worthless even if MHDC finds another site at so attracttive a price.
More importantly, petitioners' argument misconceives our
standing requirements It has long been clear that economic
injury is not the only kind of injury which can support a
8 PetitiOiwrs contend that MHDC lacks standing to pursue its claim
here because a contract purchaser whose contract is contingent upon
rezoning cannot contest a zoning decision in the Illinois courts. Under
the law of Illinois, only the owner of the property has standing to
pursue such an action. Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. City of Evanston,
23 Ill. 2d 48, 177 N. E. 2d 191 (1961); but see Solomon v. City of
Evanston, 29 Ill. App. 3d 782, 331 N. E. 2d 380 (1975).
State law, however, doPS not govern the standing detrrmination in
the federal courts.
The constitutional and prudential considerations
canvassed at length in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 ( 1975), rr,.;pond
to concerns that arc peculiarly federal in nature. Illinois may choose to
close its courts to applicants for rezoning unless they have an interest
more direct that MHDC's, but this choice does not necPssarily disqualify
MHDC from seeking relief in federal courts for an asserted injury to its
federal rights.
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plaintiff's standing. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at
686- 687; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 734 (1972);
Data Procesing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 154 (1970) . .
MHDC is a nonprofit corporation. Its interest in building
Lincoln Green stems not from a desire for economic gain ,
but rather from an interest in making suitable low-cost housing available in areas where such housing is scarce. This interest is not mere abstract concern about a problem. See
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 739. The specific proj ect
MHDC intends to build, whether or not it will generate
profits, provides that "essential dimension of specificity" that
informs judicial decisionmaking. Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221 (1974).

B
Clearly MHDC has met the constitutional requirements
and it therefore does have standing to assert its own rights.
Foremost among them is MHDC's right to be free of arbitrary
or irrational zoning actions. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S.
183 (1928); Village of Eelle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1
( 1974). But the heart of this litigation has never been the
claim that the Village's decision fails the generous Euclid
test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre. Instead it has been
the claim that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminates
against racial minorities in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a corporation, MHDC has no racial identity
and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged
discrimination. In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S., at 499. But we need not decide whether to depart
from that prudential limita.tion here and permit MHDC to
assert the constitutional rights of its prospective minority
tenants. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953); cf.
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 220, 237
(1969); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 72-73 (1917) .

..
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For we have in this case at least one individual plaintiff
who has demonstrated standing to assert these rights as his
own.9
Respondent Ransom, a Negro, works at the Honeywell
factory in Arlington Heights and lives approximately 20
miles away in Evanston in a 5-room house with his mother
and his son. The complaint alleged that he seeks and would
qualify for the housing MHDC wants to build in Arlington
Heights. Ransom testified at trial that if Lincoln Green
were built he would probably move there, since it is closer
to his job.
The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing
nearer his employment has been thwarted by official action
that is racially discriminatory. If the court grants the relief
he seeks, there is at least a "substantial probability," Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 504, that the Lincoln Green project
will materialize, affording · Ransom the housing opportunity
he desires in Arlington Heights. His is not a generalized grievance. Instead, as we suggested in Warth, id., at 507, 508
n. 18, it focuses on a particular project and is not dependent
on speculation about the possible actions of third parties not
before the court. See id., at 505; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
W elfw·e Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 41-42. Unlike the individual plaintiffs in Warth, Ransom has adequately averred an
"actionable causal relationship" between Arlington Heights'
zoning practices and his asserted injury. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S., at 507. We therefore proceed to the merits.

III
Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S.
229 ( 1976), made it clear that official action will not be held
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disBecause of the presence of this plaintiff, we need not consider
whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to
maintain the suit.
9

75-616-0PINION
12 ARLINGTON HEIGHTS v. METROPOLITAN HOUSING CORP.

proportionate impact. "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touch stone of an invidious
racial discrimination." I d., at 242. Proof of racia.lly discrilJl·
inatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. Although some contrary indications may be drawn from some of our cases,' 0 the holding
in Davis reaffirmed a principle well established in a variety
of contexts. E. g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U . .S.
189, 208 (1973) (schools); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S.
52, 56-57 (1964) (election districting); Akins v. Texas, 3~5
U. S. 398, 403-404 (1945) (jury selection).
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the chal'lenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that
a particular purposes was the "dominant" or "primary" one. 11
In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their
decisions, absent a showing or arbitrariness or irrationality.
But racial discrimination deserves no weight in the legislative
scales. When there is proof that a discriminatory purpose
has been a substantial factor in the decision, this judicial
deference is no longer justified. 12
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971); Wright v. Council
of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451, 461-462 (1972); cf. United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 381-386 (1968). Sec discussion in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242-~44 (1976).
11 In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-277 (1973), in a some~
what different context, we observed:
"The search for legislative purpose is often elusive enough, Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), without a requirement that primacy be
~certained.
Legislation is frequently multi purposed: the removal of
even a 'subordinate' purpose may shift altogether the consensus of legislative jtldgment supporting the statute."
12 For a scholarly discussion of legislative motivation, see Bre;,'""t, Palmer
10
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Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was
a substantial factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action-whether it "bears
more heavily on one race than another," Washington v. Davis,
426 U. S., at 242-may provide an important starting point.
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other
than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United
States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268
(1939); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 ·u. S. 339 (1960). The
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy? 3 But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or
Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative/ 1 and the Court
must look to other evidence. 15
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary
source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions
taken for invidious purposes. See Lane v. Wilson, supra;
Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Davis
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legisla.tive Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 116-118.
13 Several of our jury selection cases fall into this category.
Because
of the nature of the jury selection task, however, we have permitted a
finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern docs
not approach the cxtrrmcs of Yiclc Wo or Gomillion. See, e. g., Tu1'ner
v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 359 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404,
407 (1967).
14 This is not to say that a consistent pattern of official discrimination
is a neccssnry predicate to a violation of the equal protection clause. A
single invidiously discriminatory governmental act-in the exercise of the
zoning power as elsewhere-would not be immunized by the absence of
such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions. See
' City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 378 (1975).
15 In many instances, to recognize the limited probative value of disproportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the "heterogeneity" of the
nation's population. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 548 (1972);
see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 248.

•.
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v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (SD Ala.), aff'd per curiam,
336 U. S. 933 (1949); cf. Keyes v. School District No. 1,
413 U. S., at 207. The specific sequence of events leading
up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on
the decisionmaker's purposes. Reitrrw,n v. Mulkey, 387 U. S.
369, 373-376 (1967); Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S.
233, 250 (1936). For example, if the property involved here
always had been zoned R-5 but suddenly was changed to
R-3 when the town learned of MHDC's plans to erect integrated housing/ 6 we would have a far different case. Departures from the normal procedural sequence also might
afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.
Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if
the factors usually considered· important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached. 17
The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by
16 See, e. g., Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F. 2d 222
· (CA7 1961) (park board allegedly condemned plaintiffs' land for ~~ park
· upon learning that the homes plaintiffs were erecting there would be sold
·under a marketing plan designed to assure integration); Kennedy Park
Homes Association, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 108 (CA2
1970) , cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1971) (town declared moratorium
on new subdivisions and rezoned area for park land shortly after learning
, of plaintiffs' plans to build low income houHing). To the extent that
the decision in Kennedy Park Homes rested solely on a finding of discriminatory impact, wf' h:we indicated our disagreement. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U. S., at 244-245.
17 See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F. 2d 1037 (CA10 1970).
The
plaintiffs in Dailey planned to build low income housing on the site of
a former school that they had purchased. The city refused to rezone
the land from PF, its · public facilities classification, to R-4, high-density
residential. All the surrounding area was zoned R-4, and both the
present and' the former planning director for the city testified that there
was no rca on "from a zoning standpoint" why the land should not be
classified R-4. Based on this and other evidencf', the Comi of Appeals
ruled that "the record sustains the [District Court's] holding of racial
motivation and· of arbitrary and unreasonable action." /d., at 1040 .
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members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings,
or reports. In some instances the members might be called
to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the
official action, although such testimony frequently will be
barred by privilege. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367
(1951); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 (1974);
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2371 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).18
The ~oregoing summary identifie·s, without purporting to
be exhaustive, ~ubjects of proper inquiry in determining
w~ether racially. discriminatory int~nt existed, With these
in mind, we now address the case before us.
IV
This case was tried 'in the District Court and reviewed in
the Court of App~als before our decision in Washington v.
Davis, supra. The respondents proceeded on the erroneous
theory that the Village's refusal to rezone carried a racially
discriminatory effect and was, without more, unconstitutional.
But both courts below understood that at least part of their
function was to examine the purpose underlying the decision.
In making its findings on this issue, the District Court noted
that some of the opponents of Lincoln Green who spoke at
the various hearings might have been motivated by opposition to minority groups. The court held, however, that the
evidence "does not warrant the conclusion that this motivated
the defendants." 373 F. Su.pp., at 211.
On appeal the Court of Appeals focused primarily on re18 Tllis Court has recognized, ever since Fletcher v. Peele, 6 Cranch 87,
130-131 (1810), that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other
branches of government. The problems involved have prompted a good
deal of scholarly commentary. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of tlw Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 , 356--361 (1949); A. Bickel,
The Least Dangerous Branch, 208-221 (1962); Ely, Legislative and
Aqministrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205
(1970); Brest, supra, n. 8.

75-616-0PINION
16 ARLINGTON HEIGHTS v. METROPOLITAN HOUSING CORP.

spondents' claim that the Village's buffer policy had not
been consistently applied and was being invoked with a
strictness here that could only demonstrate some other underlying motive. The court concluded that the buffer policy,
though not always applied with perfect consistency, had on
several occasions formed the basis for the Board's decision
to deny other rezoning proposals. "The evidence does not
necessitate a finding that Arlington Heights administered this
policy in a discriminatory manner." 517 F. 2d, at 412. The
Court of Appeals therefore approved the District Court's
findings concerning the Village's purposes in denying rezoning
to MHDC.
We also have reviewed the evidence. The impact of the
Village's decision does arguably bear more heavily on racial
minorities. Minorities comprise 181o of the Chl.cago area
population, and 40% of the income groups said to be eligible
for Lincoln Green. Although this disparity is not excessive,
when viewed agains~ the background of substantial de facto
housing segregation in Arlington Heights, it docs support further inquiry. But the evidence tending to negate the presence
of discriminatory purpose substantially outweights the ambiguous force of the disparity. There is little about the
sequence of events leading up to the decision that would
spark suspicion.
The area around the Viatorian property
has been zoned R-3 since 1959, the year when Arlington
Heights first adopted a zoning map. Single-family homes
surround the 80-acre site, and the Village is undeniably committed to single-family homes as its dominant residential land
use. The rezoning request progressed according to the usual
procedures. 10 The Plan Commission even scheduled two ad10 Respondents have made much of one apparent proredural departure.
The parties stipulated that the Village Planner, the staff member whose
primary responsibility covered zoning and planning matters, was never
asked for his written or oral opinion of the rezoning request. The
omission does seem curious, but respondents failed to prove at trial what
role the Planner customarily played in rezoning decisions. The record
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ditional hearings, at least in part to accommodate MHDC
and permit it to supplement its presentation with answers
to questions generated at the first hearing.
The statements by the Plan Commission and Village Board
members, as reflected in the official minutes, focused almost
exclusively on the zoning aspects of the MHDC petition,
and the zoning factors on which they relied are not novel
criteria in the Village's rezoning decisions. There is no reason to doubt that there has been reliance by some neighboring property owners on the maintenance of single-family
zoning in the vicinity. The Village originally adopted its
buffer policy long before MHDC entered the picture and has
applied the policy too consistently for us to infer discriminatory purpose from its application in this case. Finally,
MHDC called one member of the Village Board to the stand
at trial. Nothing in her testimony supports an inference of
invidious purpose. 20
In sum, the evidence does not warrant overturning the
concurrent findings of both courts below. Respondents simply failed to prove that discriminatory purpose was a substantial factor in the Village's decision. This conclusion ends the
constitutional inquiry. The Court of Appeals' further finding that the Village's decision carried a discriminatory "ultidoes not indicate whether this omission represents a substantial departure
from the usual procedures.
20 Respondents complain that the District Court unduly limited their
efforts to prove that the Village Board acted for discriminrrtory purposes,
since it forbade questioning Board members about their motivation at
the time they cast their votes. We perceive no abuse of discretion in
the circumstances of this case, even if such an inquiry into motivrrtion
would otherwise have been proper. Seen. 18, supra. RespondPnts were
allowed, both during the di::;covery phase and at trial, to quesiion Board
members fully about materials and information available to them at the
time of decision. In light of respondents' repeated insistence that it
was effect and not motivation which would make out a constitutional
violation, the District Court's action was not improper.
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mate effect" is without independent legal significance. The
judgment is reversed.

v

Respondents' complaint also alleged that the refusal to
rezone violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et
seq. They have urged that claim here. The Court of Appeals, however, proceeding in a somewhat unorthodox fashion,
did not decide the statutory question. We remand the case
for further consideration limited to that issue.
Reversed and remanded ..

